

Martin Smith

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Areas of Specialisation

Epistemology

Areas of Competence

Logic, Philosophy of Law, Ethics

Education and Qualifications

2001 – 2005 PhD in Philosophy at the Australian National University.

Awarded in December 2005.

1996 – 2000 Bachelor of Arts (Honours) at the University of Western Australia.

Academic Employment

Aug 2019 – present Reader, University of Edinburgh

Jan 2016 – Aug 2019 Lecturer, University of Edinburgh

Sep 2008 – Dec 2015 Lecturer, University of Glasgow

Jan 2008 – Sep 2008 Lecturer, University of St Andrews

Sep 2006 – Jan 2008 Executive Director of Arché, University of St Andrews

Jan 2006 – Jun 2006 Lecturer, University of York

Honorary Positions

Sep 2009 – Sep 2015 Associate Fellow of the Northern Institute of Philosophy,
University of Aberdeen

Sep 2009 – Sep 2015 Honorary Research Fellow, University of Aberdeen

Publications

Book

2016 *Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief* (Oxford University Press)

Papers

Forthcoming ‘Civil Liability and the 50%+ Standard of Proof’ *International Journal of Evidence and Proof*

Forthcoming ‘More on Normic Support and the Criminal Standard of Proof’ *Mind*

Forthcoming ‘The Hardest Paradox for Closure’ *Erkenntnis*

Forthcoming ‘Against Legal Probabilism’ in Robson, J. and Hoskins, Z. eds. *Truth and Trial* (Routledge)

Forthcoming ‘Epistemic Logic Without Closure’ *Synthese* (with Stephan Leuenberger)

2021 ‘Four Arguments for Denying that Lottery Beliefs are Justified’ in Douven, I. ed *Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief* (Cambridge University Press)

2020 ‘Varieties of Risk’ *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* v101(2), pp432-455 (with Philip Ebert and Ian Durbach)

- 2019 'Full Blooded Entitlement' in Pedersen, N. and Graham, P. eds. *Epistemic Entitlement* (Oxford University Press)
- 2018 'When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?' *Mind* v127(508), pp1193-1218, included in OUP's list of best philosophy papers of 2018
- 2018 'The Logic of Epistemic Justification' *Synthese* v195(9), pp3857-3875
- 2018 'Coin Trials' *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* v48(5), pp726-741
- 2018 'Lottery Judgments: A Philosophical and Experimental Study' *Philosophical Psychology* v31(1), pp110-138 (with Philip Ebert and Ian Durbach)
- 2017 'Why Throwing 92 Heads in a Row is not Surprising' *Philosophers' Imprint* v17, winner of the inaugural [Sanders Prize for Public Philosophy](#)
- 2017 'The Cost of Treating Knowledge as a Mental State' in Carter, A., Gordon, E. and Jarvis, B. eds. *Knowledge First* (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
- 2017 'Intuitionistic Probability and the Bayesian Objection to Dogmatism' *Synthese* v194(10), pp3997-4009
- 2016 'Scepticism by a Thousand Cuts' *International Journal for the Study of Skepticism* v6(1), pp44-52
- 2015 'Evidential Incomparability and the Principle of Indifference' *Erkenntnis* v80(3), pp605-616
- 2014 'Knowledge, Justification and Normative Coincidence' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* v89(2), pp273-295
- 2014 'The Arbitrariness of Belief' in Zardini, E. and Dodd, D. eds. *Scepticism and Perceptual Justification* (Oxford: Oxford University Press)
- 2014 'The Epistemology of Religion' *Analysis* v74(1), pp135-147

- 2013 'Entitlement and Evidence' *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* v91(4), pp735-753
- 2013 'Two Notions of Epistemic Risk' *Erkenntnis* v78(5), pp1069-1079
- 2012 'Some Thoughts on the JK-Rule' *Noûs* v46(4), pp791-802
- 2012 'Belief and Degrees of Belief' *Dialectica* v66(3), pp305-308 (with Philip Ebert)
- 2011 'God and the External World' *Ratio* v24(1), pp65-77
- 2010 'A Generalised Lottery Paradox for Infinite Probability Spaces' *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* v61(4), pp821-831
- 2010 'What Else Justification Could Be' *Noûs* v44(1), pp10-31 reprinted in Neta, R. ed. *Epistemology* (Routledge, 2012)
- 2009 'Transmission Failure Explained' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* v79(1), pp164-189
- 2007 'Ceteris Paribus Conditionals and Comparative Normalcy' *Journal of Philosophical Logic* v36(1), pp97-121

Book Reviews

- 2017 Review of *Pragmatic Encroachment, Religious Belief and Practice* by Aaron Rizzieri *European Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, v9
- 2014 Review of *Justification and the Truth Connection* by Clayton Littlejohn, *Philosophical Quarterly* v64
- 2013 Review of *Quitting Certainties* by Michael Titelbaum, *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*

Grants and Awards

- Awarded, along with Dr Philip Ebert, an AHRC research grant for a project entitled **Varieties of Risk** (Sep 2020 – Mar 2023) Value: £767,237

- Awarded the inaugural **Sanders Prize for Public Philosophy** for my paper ‘Why Throwing 92 Heads in a Row is Not Surprising’, Nov 2016
<http://www.marcsandersfoundation.org/sanders-prizes/public-philosophy-award/>
- Awarded, along with Dr Stephan Leuenberger and Professor Burkhard Schafer, an AHRC Research Grant for a project entitled **The Whole Truth**, Jan 2016 – Aug 2017. Value: £186,781
<https://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/humanities/research/philosophyresearch/researchprojects/thewholetruth/>
- Awarded an AHRC Research Leadership Grant for a project entitled **Justification and Probability**, Sep 2014 – Mar 2015. Value: £64,543
<https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FL009633%2F1>
- Awarded grants from the Scots Philosophical Association, the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association to support a series of workshops in epistemology and law. Combined Value: £4,050.

Teaching and Supervision

Teaching

I have taught extensively at sub-honours, honours and postgraduate levels. I have taught courses on the following topics:

- Epistemology
- Formal Epistemology
- Philosophy of Law
- Logic
- Critical Thinking
- Philosophy of Science
- Metaphysics
- Russell and Ayer

Supervision

I am currently primary supervisor for three PhD students. Topics I currently supervise/have supervised include:

- Decision Theory and Normative Ethics
- Fictionalism and Scepticism
- Epistemic Anxiety and Epistemic Risk
- The Analysis of Knowledge
- Epistemic Gradualism
- Externalist Accounts of Evidence
- Epistemological Disjunctivism
- Proper Functionalist Accounts of Warrant
- Foreknowledge and Predestination
- Counterfactual Analyses of Causation
- The Epistemology of Emotions

Recent Presentations

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| Jan 2021 | ‘Risky Belief’ COGITO Work in Progress Workshop, University of Glasgow (online) |
| Oct 2020 | ‘Lexical Priority, Decision Theory and De Minimis Risk’ CEPPA Seminar Series, University of St Andrews (online) |
| Feb 2020 | ‘Lexical Priority, Decision Theory and De Minimis Risk’ Luck, Risk and Competence Workshop, University of Seville |
| Feb 2020 | ‘The Hardest Paradox for Closure’ Institute of Philosophy, University of London |
| Jun 2019 | ‘The Hardest Paradox for Closure’ Closure and Transmission Workshop, University of Edinburgh |

- Apr 2019 'Accuracy, Proof and the Right Against Wrongful Conviction'
University of Helsinki
- Apr 2019 'The Hardest Paradox for Closure' Competence and Success in
Epistemology Workshop, University of Helsinki
- Apr 2019 'Accuracy, Proof and the Right Against Wrongful Conviction'
Evidence in Ethics and the Law Conference, Jagiellonian University,
Krakow (Keynote Address)
- Mar 2019 'Accuracy, Proof and the Right Against Wrongful Conviction' JC
Smith Trust Fund Visiting Scholar Workshop, University of
Nottingham
- Aug 2018 'Civil Liability and the 50%+ Standard of Proof', University of Gdansk
- Aug 2018 'When Does Evidence Support Belief?' Formal Philosophy Workshop,
University of Gdansk
- Jun 2018 'Civil Liability and the 50%+ Standard of Proof' University of
Edinburgh
- Apr 2018 'Civil Liability and the 50%+ Standard of Proof', University of Aarhus
- Nov 2017 'Epistemic Logic Without Closure' Glasgow/Melbourne Formal
Philosophy Workshop (with Stephan Leuenberger)
- Sep 2017 'When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?' Epistemology Research
Group, University of Edinburgh
- Jun 2017 'When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?' Workshop on Truth,
Knowledge and the Criminal Trial, University of Nottingham
- Jun 2017 'The Logic of Epistemic Justification' Workshop on Fallibility,
Rational Belief and Knowledge, University of Barcelona
- May 2017 'The Logic of Epistemic Justification' Leuven-Cologne Epistemology
Workshop, University of Leuven (Keynote Address)

- May 2017 'Violence Risk Assessment in the Law and the Group to Individual Problem' Total Evidence Workshop, University of Edinburgh
- Feb 2017 'When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?' Workshop on Legal Standards of Proof, University of Edinburgh
- Nov 2016 'Fallibilism, Infallibilism and the Logic of Epistemic Justification' Certainty and Infallibilism Conference, Collège de France, Paris
- Oct 2016 'A Puzzle About Knowledge, Justification and the Future' University of St Andrews
- Jun 2016 'The Logic of Epistemic Justification' Epistemology Workshop, University of Stockholm
- Apr 2016 'Why Throwing 92 Heads in a Row is Not Surprising' University of Edinburgh
- Nov 2015 'Lottery Beliefs Are Not Justified' University of Glasgow
- Oct 2015 'When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?' University of St Andrews
- Feb 2015 'Every Belief Has a Right to be True' Glasgow Centre for Open Studies Public Lecture Series
- Dec 2014 'When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?' Workshop on Statistical Evidence in Epistemology and the Law, University of Glasgow
- Nov 2014 'The Cost of Treating Knowledge as a Mental State' Knowledge First Workshop, University of Edinburgh
- Sep 2014 'When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?' Norms of Reasoning Workshop, University of Bochum
- Jun 2014 'Every Belief Has a Right to be True' Yonsei University, Seoul
- Apr 2014 'When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?' University of Groningen

Professional Service

Examiner Appointments

- I have twice served as external examiner for a PhD thesis (2010, 2018)
- I have served as external examiner for a research Masters thesis (2015).
- I have served five times as internal examiner for a PhD thesis (2012, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2020).

Memberships/Editorships

- I am a member of the scientific board of the *British Society for the Theory of Knowledge*, 2020 –
- I am a member of the editorial board of the *Philosophical Quarterly*, 2015 –
- I am a member of the editorial panel of the journal *Thought*, 2011 –
- I am an area editor for the *PhilPapers* directory of online philosophical books and articles, editing the category ‘Transmission of Warrant’ (2010 –) and ‘Evidence and Proof in Law (2017 –)
- I was guest editor for the journal *Dialectica*, 2012-2013

Refereeing

- I have refereed research grant applications for the Leverhulme Trust and for the University of Leuven (2016, 2017).
- I was appointed as an external assessor for the University of Aberdeen trial REF. (2012)
- I have refereed for the following journals: *Analysis*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *Dialectica*, *Dialogue*, *Episteme*, *Erkenntnis*, *Ergo*, *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, *International Journal for the Study of Skepticism*, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, *International Studies in the*

Philosophy of Science, Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Journal of Philosophical Logic, Journal of Philosophy, Journal of Political Philosophy, Law and Philosophy, Logic and Logical Philosophy, Mind, Modern Law Review, Noûs, Philosophers' Imprint, Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Review, Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Polish Journal of Philosophy, Synthese, Theoria, Thought.

- I have refereed book proposals and manuscripts for Routledge and for Oxford University Press.

Conference Organisation

May 2017	Conference on the requirement of total evidence at the University of Edinburgh
Dec 2014	Conference on statistical evidence in epistemology and the law at the University of Glasgow
May 2010	Conference on belief and degrees of belief at the University of Stirling
Dec 2009	Conference on the lottery paradox at the University of Glasgow