BUILDING A CITIZENS' WELFARE STATE

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Building a Citizens' Welfare State. Baillie Lecture 2000[1]

Introduction

It is an honour to be invited to give this year's lecture in memory of the eminent theologian John Baillie. I hope it will not be taken as a mark of disrespect to John Baillie if I also dedicate the lecture to the memory of Donald Dewar, and indirectly John Smith, described by Donald Dewar as 'a man with unyielding principles who believed in social justice and redistribution of opportunity and wealth' words true of Donald Dewar himself.

New Labour prefers not to use the 'r' word although it does still speak the language of social justice, perhaps rather more so here in Scotland, where, in place of a social exclusion strategy, the Scottish Executive has promoted a 'vision for delivering social justice in Scotland', 'at the heart' of its Programme for Government. Indeed, there is now a Minister for Social Justice. At Westminster, the commitment to social justice shines through most clearly in the pledge to eradicate child poverty. But New Labour has explicitly disowned an egalitarian conceptualisation of social justice. Moreover, its many progressive policies are often overshadowed by more punitive policies and language designed in part to appease the *Daily Mail* readers of Middle England.

Modernisation rather than social justice appears to be the guiding light of welfare reform. These goals are not incompatible – indeed the Commission on Social Justice's report represented an attempt to fuse the two. But there is a danger that social justice considerations are now being subordinated to a narrow conceptualisation of modernisation, which sets up a false dichotomy between 'active' (read positive) welfare focused on paid work as the salvation of all and 'passive' (read negative) welfare which, it is argued, promotes 'welfare dependency'. Thus, while some of the Government's actions can be seen as steps towards a citizens' welfare state, others represent diversions or worse still obstacles to progress.

What I want to do this evening is to suggest a set of principles, and related policies, which might offer us an alternative route to a citizens' welfare state. These are: risk protection; an egalitarian conception of social justice; recognition of diversity; recognition of the value of unpaid forms of work as an expression of the responsibilities of citizenship; democracy and 'voice'; and internationalism. Together they add up to a vision of inclusive citizenship and I will therefore conclude with some more general, very brief, thoughts about citizenship.

1. Risk Protection

Social security is commonly understood as an institutional device for transferring money to certain groups of the population in order to protect them against risk and to prevent or at least alleviate poverty. However, as Adrian Sinfield (1989) has underlined, social security is not simply a means; it is also an end, i.e. a state of financial security in the face of risk.

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It is well known that the nature of these risks has changed. The post-war welfare state was built on the assumption that 'a Fordist economy guarantees decent pay and secure employment. The post-industrial economy is less likely to provide such guarantees; indeed, the average worker's life-cycle risks will increase substantially' (Esping-Andersen, 1994: 183). The theme was taken up by the Commission on Social Justice which located these 'life-cycle risks' in both the workplace and the changing patterns of family life, warning that such risks are both 'less predictable and more probable than were those of the 1950s' (CSJ, 1994: 222). It argued that:

> far from making the welfare state redundant, social and economic change creates a new and even more vital need for the security which the welfare state was designed to provide. Frightened people cannot welcome change; they can only resist it or be defeated by it. It takes secure people - secure in their abilities, their finances and their communities - to cope with change at the workplace or in the home (CSJ, 1994: 222).

More recently, David Blunkett (2000) has spoken of the welfare state as 'an enabling force', 'helping [men and women] to overcome fear of change, minimise risk and seize the opportunities of the new economy'. However, in the same speech, he hinted at a further reduction in the overall welfare responsibilities of the state. Any such reduction is likely to damage those on whom the impact of 'the risk society' bears most heavily, that is those least able to negotiate its contingencies, reflecting class and other social divisions.

The continued importance of public social security provision in this context has been underlined by a Joseph Rowntree Foundation study. This concluded that 'collectively financed social security may offer a better deal than is commonly supposed, not just for those with low incomes and at high risk, but also for those with average incomes and at more typical risk' (Burchardt, and Hills, 1997:4).

While the Commission did not see public social security as the sole mechanism for helping people to deal with contemporary risks, it did, nevertheless, acknowledge its role as 'a crucial source of financial security for most people' within the context of a mixed economy of welfare (CSJ, 1994: 224). 'A modern system of social insurance tailored to changing employment risks and family needs' was a central plank in its welfare reform strategy (CSJ, 1994: 229).

The specific reforms it proposed were designed to address one of the key weaknesses of the national insurance system: its anachronistic template, modelled on male employment patterns, which excludes many female workers from the scheme. The theme was taken up more recently by the Social Security Select Committee which called for a 'more inclusive' national insurance system, 'an urgent priority being to adapt the scheme better to modern employment patterns' (2000: para. 145).

There have been some policy initiatives in this direction, but the overall direction of policy is towards greater reliance on both means-tested and

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private forms of provision. The various Green Papers on welfare reform have not explicitly addressed the future of social insurance for those of working age (apart from the occasional opaque reference). Instead, adopting an incremental benefit-by-benefit approach to reform, the Government is disinclined to debate the shape of the social security system's underlying architecture.

The Social Security Secretary, Alistair Darling has described such debates as 'dogmatic'. He is more interested in what is 'cost-effective'. Likewise, the Prime Minister used his 1999 Beveridge lecture to stress that in the mix of 'universal and targeted help', 'the one is not "superior" or "more principled" than the other (Blair, 1999). Many would disagree. While acknowledging that it is unrealistic to envisage a social security system with no meanstesting, it is widely believed that means-testing is divisive, inefficient and a less effective form of protection against risks.

The danger is that the shift under the Conservatives, away from a social insurance based social security and pensions system towards a means-tested based one, is being continued by default without any public debate about the appropriate balance between the different kinds of benefits - contributory, means-tested and contingency. According to Nicholas Timmins, Public Policy Editor of the *Financial Times*, 'national insurance is dead...Government ministers know they are accelerating its destruction, but do not want to talk about it much (*Financial Times*, 22 November, 1999).

The direction in which they are taking policy has been signposted by *The Economist*: 'Tony Blair's Government has crossed the Rubicon from...the left bank of welfare-for-all to the right bank of means testing' (6 March, 1999). Even if possibly something of an overstatement (given, for example, counter indications such as increases in the real value of child benefit), these observation acts as a hazard warning that we may be moving further down the road towards a residual poverty relief model of social security.

This takes us further away from more institutionalised Continental European models, which, even if they are themselves also under pressure, have been more effective in guaranteeing genuine social security. According to a study of social insurance in Europe, 'Britain is unique with respect to the way in which its social insurance system has "withered"' (Clasen and Erskine, 1998: 4).

Social security's function in relation to risk is not confined to that of protection. It also has a role to play in helping people to take risks. For instance, the provision of decent benefits for lone parents can be crucial in enabling women with children to leave violent or abusive relationships. Likewise, as Tony Giddens (1998: 116) has observed 'deciding to go to work and give up benefits, or taking a job in a particular industry are risk-infused activities'. As part of a 'third way' approach to welfare reform, he calls for benefit systems to encourage a 'more active risk-taking attitude...wherever possible through incentives, but where necessary by legal obligations' (Giddens, 1998: 122).

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Underlying this and similar justifications for 'activation' measures to encourage or oblige benefit claimants to take the risk of giving up the relative security of benefit payments for the insecurity of the modern labour market is often an assumption that benefits for those out of work have to be kept as low as possible so as not to discourage such risk-taking.

There is, though, another perspective on this which points to the very opposite policy conclusion. There is evidence to suggest that, without the protection of a reasonable safety net and the buffer of some savings, or worse still if in debt (including to the social fund) benefit claimants are less likely to be willing to take the risk of a job in a labour market, which offers most of the workless only temporary, part-time, self-employed or low skill jobs.

Other research suggests that the greater the hardship experienced by lone mothers, the less likely they are to move into employment. The researchers speculate that 'hardship may influence employment rates by exhausting mothers and leaving them no time or money for job search' (Bryson, et al, 1997: 29). It is through such evidence that the false dichotomy between 'active' and 'passive' welfare is revealed most sharply.

2. An egalitarian conception of social justice

The issue of benefit levels is also an important one in its own right and represents one item on the wider agenda of an egalitarian conception of social justice. There is a considerable body of evidence, of various kinds, which testifies to the inadequacy of benefit levels, particularly in the case of families with children reliant on benefit for more than a short period. (According to the very useful Lothian Anti Poverty Alliance website, at least a quarter of children in Scotland are in families on income support.) Without an adequate income, it is difficult for people living on benefit to be full participants in the wider society, enjoying full rights of citizenship and exercising their responsibilities as citizens.

To its credit, despite its own earlier strictures against relieving poverty through 'cash handouts', the Government has raised the real value of income support rates for children, significantly so for young children. But it has done so so quietly that many people are unaware of it. At the same time, it has ignored calls for a comprehensive review of the adequacy of benefit levels, despite the fact that there has been no official public review of benefit levels since they were set after the War.

The case has been made for a minimum income standard (MIS) that would function as a benchmark against which benefit levels can be assessed. The European Commission has recommended that member states should set a MIS at a level 'considered sufficient to cover essential needs with regard to respect for human dignity'. The introduction of a MIS would open up to public debate the whole issue of what it is appropriate to expect our fellow citizens to survive on.

The Government's reluctance to countenance a general improvement in benefit levels in part signals its rejection of what is regarded as an outdated

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model of 'tax and spend', in which the better off are taxed more in order to spend more on the worse off. Such policies are considered unsustainable in the context of economic globalisation, which tends to be treated as uncontrollable fact of modern life, closing down the political choices open to governments. Any redistribution which is effected (and recent Budgets have been redistributive) has to be, what David Blunkett once dubbed 'quiet' redistribution.

This political stance is underpinned by a philosophical shift in official Labour Party thinking. The goal of (greater) equality (of outcome) has been replaced with that of equality of opportunity, to be achieved by the 'redistribution of possibilities' (Giddens, 1998: 101) rather than of resources. This was summed up by the Chancellor as a rejection by New Labour of 'equality of outcome as neither desirable nor feasible, imposing uniformity and stifling human potential; instead it espouses a view of equality of opportunity that is recurrent, lifelong and comprehensive' (*The Guardian*, 2 August, 1997).

Likewise in his speech to the 1999 Labour Party conference, Tony Blair called for 'true equality – equal worth, an equal chance of fulfilment, equal access to knowledge and opportunity', 'not equal incomes. Not uniform lifestyles or taste and culture'. In both cases, echoing the classic anti-egalitarian caricature, greater equality of outcome is being conflated with sameness and uniformity.

I can't think of anyone in serious politics who is arguing for equality of outcome in a literal sense. Even those who cherish the principle concede that, in practical politics, it has to be traded against other principles such as liberty. What egalitarians argue for is *greater* equality of outcome than we have and part of the argument, following Tawney, is that it is extreme inequalities that prevent the flourishing of human diversity. We live in a society of extreme inequalities: inequality was higher in the 1990s than at any time since the 1940s, the result of an increase in inequality under the previous Government which was one of the most rapid in the industrialised world.

Extreme inequalities also undermine equal worth in its more meaningful sense, as articulated by theorists such as David Miller and Anne Phillips (and John Wilson in his Smith Institute Pamphlet). Here it is about the 'reciprocal recognition of equal standing', social relationships and how we live together and is opposed to social hierarchies. In a massively unequal society such as ours, it is not just a question of the exclusion from the bonds of common citizenship of those at the bottom, but also the way in which those at the top can exclude themselves from these bonds and thereby fail to recognise the equal worth of their fellow citizens.

Equality of opportunity is not a strong enough answer, even when formulated in expansive, lifelong, terms as Gordon Brown does. The meritocratic vision, which equality of opportunity conjures up, rewards those who succeed and penalises and stigmatises as failures those who don't. In doing so it legitimises inequality and the privileges associated with it. And it reduces the

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legitimacy of the claims of those at the bottom for adequate benefits. I can't put it better than Tawney:

> intelligent tadpoles reconcile themselves to the inconvenience of their position by reflecting that though most of them will live to be tadpoles and nothing more, the more fortunate of the species will one day shed their tails, distend their mouths and stomachs, hop nimbly on to dry land and croak addresses to their former friends on the virtues by means of which tadpoles of character and capacity can rise to be frogs (1952: 108).

Also, as Tony Giddens, a proponent of the 'redistribution of possibilities' rather than of resources, has conceded, ultimately equality of opportunity is self-defeating, as the privileged will confer advantages on their children – thus undermining genuine equality of opportunity. At the bottom of the ladder, the evidence suggests that poverty makes it difficult, if well nigh impossible, for some children to grasp the opportunities being offered to them. At its most basic hungry children do not make good students.

Indeed, I can remember the point being made vividly in evidence from a local school here in Edinburgh to a city Poverty Inquiry in which I was involved. The evidence concluded: 'Many young people are prevented from capitalising on their educational potential by the direct and indirect effect of poverty. Sometimes they are so preoccupied with the struggle to survive in their homes and communities that education is not only irrelevant but an unwanted extra pressure'.

Such evidence reinforces the case for adequate benefit levels and the wider case for a redistributive tax-benefit policy. Quiet redistribution, welcome as it is, is not enough. While any project of redistribution to the poor and powerless inevitably faces political and economic constraints, the political constraints are likely to be greater, if there is no attempt to make the positive case for redistribution. Without such an attempt, it will be impossible to build the constituency of support for redistributive policies which is necessary if they are to take root.

Indeed, the latest British Social Attitudes Survey suggests that the ground may be more fertile than the Government appears to assume, with clear majorities believing that the Government has a responsibility to reduce an income gap which is perceived to be too wide.

A Government which places so much emphasis on the responsibilities of citizenship of those at the bottom needs to redress the balance through the rehabilitation of taxation as an expression of citizenship responsibility among the better off. The importance of taxation to citizenship was the message of a recent Fabian Society pamphlet. In a Foreword to it, Raymond Plant, Chair of the Society's Commission on Citizenship and Taxation, argued that the erasure of taxation from the agenda of political debate is bad for democracy, as the Government discovered to its cost in the fuel crisis.

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The case for taxation has also been made recently by John Hills who criticises the image of taxation as a 'burden', pointing out that taxation represents 'a vital mechanism to ensure that collective aims can be met and for ends which the market would fail to achieve' (2000: 30 & 1).

3. Recognition of diversity

This more positive construction of tax is essential to an egalitarian conception of social justice. However, such a conception is not just about addressing socio-economic inequalities as conventionally measured. It is also about addressing other cross-cutting dimensions of inequality most notably those associated with gender, 'race', ethnicity (and in some societies, religion) and disability. These dimensions of inequality take us beyond a politics of redistribution to engage also with a politics of recognition, dubbed by Nancy Fraser as the 'paradigmatic form of political conflict' in the contemporary world.

The politics of recognition is played out through the demands of marginalised groups for recognition of their *particular* perspectives and needs, couched in a discourse of difference. Thus, for example, racialised groups have resisted assimilation as the price of racial and ethnic equality and equal citizenship. For many gays and lesbians, equal citizenship is not about incorporation into heterosexist norms, but recognition of 'a plurality of relationships without a hierarchical ordering of them', as exemplified in the debate on Section 28 (Donovan et al, 1999: 692).

Jan Pakulski has interpreted such positions through the lens of the notion of cultural citizenship rights: 'a new set of citizenship claims that involve the right to unhindered and legitimate representation, and propagation of identities and lifestyles through the information systems and in public fora'. He distinguishes three elements: 'the right to symbolic presence and visibility (vs. marginalisation); the right to dignifying representation (vs. stigmatisation); and the right to propagation of identity and maintenance of lifestyles (vs. assimilation)' (Pakulski, 1997: 80).

Although cultural citizenship rights are about the recognition of difference, Pakulski interprets them as also contributing to the further universalising of citizenship. As such they provide a bridge to a second dimension of recognition demands, that is for recognition of the *common* humanity of different groups and the equal worth of each citizen, which flows from that. This is an argument sometimes used in support of the *universal* provision of welfare benefits and services. Common usage of the same health, education and social services and social security benefits strengthens the ties of equal citizenship. This aspect of the recognition argument also reinforces my earlier argument for an egalitarian conceptualisation of social justice.

A progressive welfare politics has to be able to embrace the two sides of the demand for recognition, difficult as this may sometimes be. An example is provided by the recent Runnymede Report on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain. Its Chair Bhikhu Parekh summed it up as a plea 'for fairness, equality and common belonging as the necessary basis of a just, plural, rich and self-

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confident Britain' (*The Guardian*, 11 October 2000). Two other examples illustrate how hitherto marginalised groups have promoted just such a dual recognition politics. The first is the success of the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition in writing into the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement a statement which could be taken as a paradigm of such an approach, even if only at the level of aspiration. The Agreement declares that power

> shall be exercised with rigorous impartiality on behalf of all the people in the diversity of their identities and traditions and shall be founded on the principles of full respect for, and equality of, civil, political, social and cultural rights, of freedom from discrimination for all citizens, and of parity of esteem and of just and equal treatment for the identity, ethos and aspirations of both communities (Governments of UK and Ireland, 1998, p2).

The second example is the disabled people's movement, which has had a considerable impact on welfare provision. The disabled people's movement has fought for welfare provisions to reflect the social model of disability, which it has developed, rather than the individualistic medical model deployed by welfare professionals. It has struggled for welfare provisions that reflect disabled people's own interpretations of their needs and for adequate income maintenance provisions. In doing so, it has used a universalistic discourse of *equal* citizenship rights and social justice while at the same time asserting disability as a *different* social and political category, not to be denied in the name of equality.

4. Recognition of the value of unpaid work

Another aspect of the recognition debate is the question of the recognition given by welfare systems to different kinds of activities such as wage-earning, child-rearing and providing care in the home. To a greater or lesser degree, welfare systems tend to privilege wage-earning over child-rearing and other caring work in the allocation of social rights. In both Europe and North America, governments increasingly are elevating paid work to the supreme expression of citizenship responsibility. Thus, the British Government is 'reforming welfare around the work ethic' and Gordon Brown has written of work as 'a duty – part of the moral ethic' (*Daily Mail*, 9 March 2000). In both cases for work, read 'paid work'; other forms of work such as voluntary and community work, as well as care work, do not really count, even if lip service is paid to their value as an adjunct to paid work.

I am not questioning the importance of paid work and I welcome the fact that full employment is once again an official goal of government. We all know too well the demoralising effects of unemployment and worklessness on individuals, families and communities. However, there are dangers in the growing tendency of governments to treat paid work as if it were the supreme responsibility of citizenship and synonymous with social inclusion. A key issue in debates about social citizenship is how voluntary/community work and unpaid care work can best be recognised and genuinely valued as expressions of citizenship responsibility. It raises difficult policy questions.

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A key one is the extent and nature of the conditions attached to benefit receipt for those of working age. At present, for instance, a key concern for many in deprived communities is that, for all the government's talk of the importance of voluntary work and community involvement, the operation of the benefit rules, and in particular the 48 hour availability for work rule, discourages such involvement. This also raises the wider question as to whether all forms of paid work are necessarily of greater value to society than the unpaid contributions many make to their local communities.

The govt is reviewing the 48 hour rule and the impact of the benefit system generally on volunteering and community involvement. However, I suspect that it is not considering these more fundamental questions. It might take a look at an experiment in the Netherlands where the Social Assistance Act of 1996 opened up the possibility of municipal experiments to promote unpaid forms of social participation by the long-term workless. A number of such schemes have been developed: the largest is Rotterdam 'Unused Qualities' project (so-named in recognition of the actual or potential contribution of workless people to society). It aims both to recognise forms of social participation in which workless people are already engaged and to stimulate new forms of social participation in a wide range of voluntary work. Participation is voluntary but it carries a dispensation from the normal job-seeking requirements.

An independent evaluation of the project concluded that despite a number of limitations, the results are generally positive 'both from the participants' and a policy-makers' perspective (indicating) that it is a valuable new type of social intervention to combat social exclusion'. The research also found non-paid forms of participation may have the same significance for individuals as paid work and can be as valuable in combating feelings of social exclusion.

More broadly, these issues are central to the debate about a basic or citizen's income, paid to all members of society without any strings attached. I'm ambivalent about such an approach but believe that it is important that it is discussed widely. More realistic, especially in these days of 'no rights without responsibilities' is the idea of a participation income which offers a kind of halfway house to a citizens income. It would provide a modest basic income but subject to a condition of active citizenship for those of working age able to do some form of work. This addresses the argument of people like Stuart White that the principle of reciprocity is violated by a totally unconditional payment.

One way of meeting the active citizenship condition would be through caring for children or others in need of care. There is a potential danger though in policies which in effect pay people to stay at home to care: they could reinforce the gendered division of labour by encouraging women to stay at home to care, thereby excluding them from full effective social, economic and political citizenship. This is in a way the flip side of the point made by a recent Industrial Society report in which it was argued that women could be disadvantaged by 'family friendly' policies designed to help only women if employers are then more reluctant to employ and promote them.

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So we need policies which recognise that both women and men have care responsibilities and which encourage men to fulfil those responsibilities. As the Industrial Society argued, parental leave, paid at a rate that makes it more likely that men will take it, is a key policy instrument here. I would go a step further and take a leaf out of the Scandinavian policy book and reserve part of the leave for fathers – the daddy month as it's called. This has had a real impact, especially in Norway, though cynics suggest that its popularity rises mysteriously during the moose-hunting season!

These issues are now being discussed as part of a wider debate about the 'work-life' balance (often pursued over business breakfasts!), which is of relevance to us all whether or not we have caring responsibilities. Matthew Taylor and Alexandra Jones have recently argued for a widening of the meaning of 'work-life' to embrace 'a balance between a rewarding job with scope for individual development and involvement in activities outside paid work' (2000: 125). In other words it is about the quality of paid work and of life outside paid work.

Meghnad Desai (2000) has gone further, arguing for making 'well being', which he defines in terms of time for social activities and relationships (but could also include more solitary pursuits), as a principal goal of welfare policy. This acts as a reminder of the original meaning of welfare – 'the state of faring or doing well'. Certainly, my longer term vision would be of fewer hours in paid work as a norm, enabling women and men to lead more balanced lives, with time just to be as well as to do. If society were moving in this kind of direction, then proposals for a participation or even citizens income become more obvious policy contenders.

5. Democracy and Voice

Returning to the theme of recognition, I want, perhaps unusually, to apply it to the politics of poverty, which increasingly can be understood as a politics of voice, a politics that is demanding recognition and respect. In one of the Centre's Occasional Papers on *The Future of Welfare*, Hilary Russell referred to Church Action on Poverty's National Poverty Hearing at which people with experience of poverty had an opportunity to speak out in the presence of people with power and influence. She explained that what was important about the Hearing

> was less that it raised awareness about poverty issues and more that it brought home the common humanity of speakers and listeners. Perhaps it will be a little harder in future for the gatekeepers in the audience to stereotype, stigmatise or marginalise. We need to develop some common idea of justice to give a framework for recognising one another. But we also need to work at recognising one another in order to have a sufficient sense of commonality or community to underpin that framework (1997: 36).

One of the most common refrains at the Hearing was the desire to be treated with greater respect. 'I just wish people would give us a chance and treat us with some respect' and 'I just feel very angry sometimes that people are

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ignorant to the fact that we are humans as well and we do need to be respected' were typical of the comments made (Russell, 1996). In an international context, the *Human Development Report 2000* identifies 'a life of respect and value' as a key aim of human development.

Disrespect and nonrecognition are, according to Nancy Fraser (1997), examples of the cultural or symbolic injustice which are the object of a politics of recognition. The principles of recognition and respect have generally been associated with movements such as those of disabled people and gays and lesbians. One of the achievements of the disabled people's movement has been to win recognition of disabled people as subjects and agents in welfare policy-making and implementation as opposed to their more traditional construction as simply the objects of policy.

One element of respect is being listened to and treated as someone whose views matter. This rarely happens in the case of people with experience of poverty or living on benefits. Their social exclusion is reinforced by their political exclusion, one element of which is exclusion from debates and policy-making about poverty and more generally from decision-making that affects their lives. Here in Scotland, there is, I believe, greater acknowledgement of this through the work of the Social Inclusion Network. Also, the recent One City report from the Lord Provost's Commission on Social Exclusion placed great emphasis on the importance of listening.

The growing demand for a voice and a say among people with experience of poverty is an example of how the two politics of redistribution and recognition can combine. Fraser was criticised for separating out the two forms of politics in her original statement of the issue. In a more recent article, she herself pays more attention to the interrelationship between economic and cultural or symbolic injustice and develops her argument in ways that are more directly applicable to the politics of poverty. She suggests that 'properly conceived, struggles for recognition can aid the redistribution of power and wealth'. The theoretical move that she makes is to treat misrecognition as a question of social status subordination and injustice, rather than of identity:

> From this perspective, what requires recognition is not group-specific identity but the status of individual group members as full partners in social interaction...It means a politics aimed at overcoming subordination by establishing the misrecognized party as a full member of society capable of participating on a par with the rest (2000: 113).

Although Fraser herself does not make the link, such an approach is highly relevant to the politics of poverty. Here a politics of recognition is not about the assertion of group difference (the last thing that most people in poverty want) but recognition in the sense of equality of status and respect, which are critical to the recognition of the full citizenship of those in poverty.

What also is at issue here is the value accorded to people in poverty's own interpretation of their situation and their needs, together with recognition of and respect for the expertise borne of experience. Bob Holman, in a book in which seven people from Easterhouse write their own personal accounts,

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argues that 'the reluctance to listen to the bottom 30 per cent devalues them....They are treated as specimens to be examined and displayed, not as human beings with the rights and capacities to participate in public debate' (1998: 16). Likewise, ATD Fourth World, which works to promote the participation of some of the poorest families in a number of countries, rejects the construction of people living in poverty as 'problems' and the 'objects of other people's knowledge, not as authors of their own development' for 'they have something to offer, something to contribute' (1999: 16).

From a more theoretical perspective, Iris Young (2000), in her latest book, argues the importance of the presence of a range of standpoints, perspectives and experiences, in particular those of excluded groups, to good judgement in policy-making. I can testify to this from my own personal experience of sitting on an independent Commission this last year, made up of half 'people in public life' and half 'grassroots' people with experience of poverty. It has been an incredibly challenging and in some ways transformative experience, which has certainly convinced me of the value of different forms of expertise and the importance to inclusive citizenship of making possible the genuine involvement and participation of groups excluded from mainstream politics.

The Commission was established by the Voices for Chance Project of the UK Coalition on Poverty. The Project has worked through a network of area and national steering groups, building up from the local level. Much of the local work has involved the use of 'participatory appraisal', one of a family of participatory methods developed in the southern hemisphere, which has been borrowed and adapted as a community development tool to work with disadvantaged communities in the industrialised world. It involves marginalised people as active participants from the outset and in some cases they are now training others in the techniques and using them in their local communities.

6. Internationalism

This is an example of how the North can learn from the South. And in the context of poverty in the South, the Department for International Development has made the case for just such a participatory approach. In a consultation document on human rights and poverty, it argues that human rights 'provide a means of empowering all people to make decisions about their own lives rather than being the passive objects of choices made on their behalf' (2000: 1). The document sets out 'the practical ways in which the human rights framework contributes to the achievement of the objective of enabling all people to be active citizens with rights, expectations and responsibilities'.

This brings me to my final principle, which is that of internationalism or a global perspective which I believe was reflected in the report of the Baillie Commission. A Charter for Global Democracy was launched in 1999 as a 'call for international accountability, equality, justice, sustainable development and democracy' (*The Observer*, 24 October 1999). Relevant here are notions of global citizenship, which reflect, at the international level, some of the rights and responsibilities associated with national citizenship. The Jubilee 2000 debt-cancellation campaign is a concrete example of such an approach.

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The concept of global citizenship encourages a focus on the responsibilities of the more affluent nation states towards poorer nations. It is accepted by a number of citizenship theorists that principles of distributive justice, combined with ecological imperatives, demand an internationalist interpretation of citizenship obligations. Social policy analysts, such as Peter Townsend (1996), are likewise arguing that poverty and injustice have to be understood and tackled at the international as well as at the national level. In the words of J.K. Galbraith, 'the responsibility for economic and social well being is general, transnational' (1996: 2). As argued by the UNDP's Human Development Reports, the impact of economic globalisation has made the case all the more urgent

Another important dimension of global citizenship and the principle of internationalism is how we treat 'outsiders', in particular asylum-seekers. Western welfare states are becoming increasingly exclusionary in their response to those seeking entry and residence. An example is the decision of the UK Government, first Conservative and now Labour, initially to restrict and now to remove the right to social security for asylum seekers. Instead, asylum seekers are now entitled only to vouchers and a small amount of pocket money. Apart from the negative implications for the material security of this group of particularly vulnerable people, there is a danger that their use of vouchers, which act as a visible indicator of their status, could, in some instances, jeopardise their physical security in the face of racist and xenophobic opposition to their presence. At the very least, the use of vouchers is stigmatising and potentially humiliating. I believe that we can only feel shame at how our country now treats asylum-seekers (although there is some suggestion that the Government is now considering a more positive stance towards those accepted as refugees).

Conclusion

There has always been a tension between citizenship's inclusionary claims and its exclusionary force. A multi-tiered conception of citizenship, which locates national citizenship in a wider internationalist context, encourages us to strengthen the inclusionary side of the coin in recognition of our responsibilities as global citizens.

The conception of citizenship that has underpinned the principles I have elaborated in this lecture, is one that draws, critically, on both of the main citizenship traditions: social liberal and civic republican. It understands citizenship as both a status and a practice, in which process as well as outcome is important. In T.H. Marshall's words, it provides us with an ideal 'against which achievements can be measured and towards which aspirations can be directed' (1950: 29). I hope that the principles of inclusive citizenship, which I have outlined this evening, will help us to raise our aspirations to lay claim to a genuine citizens' welfare state.

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