Xintong Wei

Postdoctoral Research Associate


I’m a postdoctoral research associate on the AHRC sponsored research project ‘Varieties of Risk’  and the recipient of the 2021-2022 Analysis Trust Research Studentship for a project on normative risk. I did my PhD at the St.Andrews/Stirling Philosophy Graduate Programme (SASP), where I also studied for the MLitt Philosophy. I received a BA in philosophy from University College London  (UCL) .

I work mainly in the intersection of Epistemology, Theory of Normativity and Philosophy of Mind. My current research focuses on epistemic risks in moral and political deliberation; epistemic agency; the epistemology of political disagreement; truth and belief. My PhD thesis investigates the normative relation between truth and belief. Three questions arise in recent discussion. Can we explain why truth is a reason for belief? How strong is truth as a reason for belief? And in what sense can truth motivate and guide our beliefs?  I defended the truth norm of belief on a reason-based normative framework and offered novel answers to those three questions. I’m also interested in a variety of topics in philosophy, including self-deception, political and feminist thought, and history of philosophy (Ancient Philosophy, Kant, Marx and Chinese Philosophy).

In my spare time I enjoy cinema, literature and photography. Despite being a Kantian, I was inspired by Peter Singer’s effective altruism. I believe that it is our moral duty to live modestly while giving the best we can (and give well)  to make the world a better place.


2017–2021 Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of St Andrews & Stirling

Thesis: ‘A Defence of the Truth Norm of Belief’


2015–2016 M.Litt. in Philosophy, University of St Andrews & Stirling

Distinction in Dissertation and Coursework

Thesis: A Minimalist Account of Self-deception 


2012–2015 BA in Philosophy, University College London

First Class Honours

Thesis: Does our Temporal Experience Favour A-theory of Time?

Research summary


Wei, X. (2022) ‘A Practice-based Account of the Truth Norm of Belief’, Episteme, 1-21. DOI:10.1017/epi.2022.26

Wei, X. (2020) ‘The Role of Pretense in the Process of Self-deception’, Philosophical Explorations,23(1):1-14. DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2020.1711960

Wei, X. (2019) ‘The Permissible Norm of Truth and “Ought Implies Can”’, Logos and Episteme, 10(4): 433-440. DOI: 10.5840/logos-episteme201910438

Wei, X. (2015) ‘Does Our Temporal Experience Favour A-theory of Time?’, British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy, 9(1):11-30.