I am interested in a variety of interrelated topics centred around epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. My current research project is an investigation in the notion of epistemic entitlement--a type of non-evidential warrant for the background commitments of our cognitive lives--with a view towards constructing a theory of entitlement along epistemic externalist lines. I am also interested in debates on the epistemology of disagreement, and the extent to which theories of epistemic entitlement will influence what we will say about cases of peer disagreement.
Current research interestsScepticism, epistemic externalism, the structure of warrant, basic belief, epistemic entitlement.
Past research interestsEpistemic norms, assertion, knowledge-first epistemology, semantics.
In either 2017 or 2018, I will carry out a two-month internship at the Academia Europaea Barcelona Knowledge Hub.
Affiliated research centres
According to one version of the sceptical paradox, the warrant we take ourselves to have for our quotidian beliefs depends, in part, on certain background commitments that are themselves unwarranted. In response, some have proposed ‘epistemic entitlements’ as a type of non-evidential, unearned warrant for these background commitments. This solution leads to the problem of warrant transmission. Internalist solutions to the problem – on both the conservative and liberal sides of the argument – are unsatisfying. The aim of this project is to consider whether an externalist account of entitlement could fare better.
Current project grants
Marie Curie Early Stage Research grant (3 years)