Duncan Pritchard


  • Philosophy
  • School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences

Contact details



Room 6.13, Dugald Stewart Building

3 Charles Street, Edinburgh
Post code


Duncan Pritchard (PhD, St. Andrews) joined the Department in July 2007 as the new Chair in Epistemology. Before coming to Edinburgh, he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. In 2007 he was awarded the Philip Leverhulme Prize. In 2011 he was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. In 2013 he delivered the annual Soochow Lectures in Philosophy in Taiwan, which were published by Princeton University Press as Epistemic Angst: Radical Scepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. In 2013 these lectures were the topic of the annual Cologne Summer School in Philosophy. Duncan is the Director of Edinburgh's Eidyn research centre. He is currently leading several externally funded Eidyn research projects, including two major collaborative and interdisciplinary Templeton-funded projects and also the Edinburgh wing of a Marie Skłodowska-Curie European Training Network.



Journal editorships

Series editorships


Edited works

Edited journal special issues

Key articles


  • ‘Ignorance and Inquiry’, American Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming). (pdf)
  • 'Intellectual Virtues and the Epistemic Value of Truth', Synthese (forthcoming). (pdf)
  • 'Assurance and Disjunctivism', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming). (pdf)
  • ‘Philosophy in Prisons: Intellectual Virtue and the Community of Philosophical Inquiry’, Teaching Philosophy (forthcoming). (pdf)
  • ‘Against the Odds: the Case for a Modal Understanding of Due Care’ (with J. Helmreich), Truth and Trials: Dilemmas at the Intersection of Epistemology and Philosophy of Law, (eds.) Z. Hoskins & J. Robson, (Routledge, forthcoming). (pdf)
  • ‘Scepticism and Epistemic Angst, Redux’, Synthese (as part of a special issue on my book, Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing), (forthcoming). (pdf)
  • 'Anti-Risk Virtue Epistemology’, Virtue Epistemology, (ed.) J. Greco & C. Kelp, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). (pdf)
  • ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism and Factive Bases for Belief’, Well-Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation, (eds.) P. Bondy & J. A. Carter, (Routledge, forthcoming). (pdf)
  • ‘Shadowlands’, The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality, (ed.) J. Dutant, (Oxford UP, forthcoming). (pdf)
  • ‘Wittgensteinian Epistemology, Epistemic Vertigo, and Pyrrhonian Scepticism’, Epistemology After Sextus Empiricus, J. Vlasits & K. M. Vogt, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). (pdf)
  • ‘Scepticism and Certainty: Moore and Wittgenstein on Commonsense and Philosophy’, Cambridge Companion to Common Sense Philosophy, (eds.) R. Peels & R. van Woudenberg, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). (pdf)
  • ‘Educating For Intellectual Humility and Conviction’, Teaching and Learning, (ed.) D. Bakhurst, (Blackwell, forthcoming). (pdf)
  • ‘Anti-Luck/Anti-Risk Epistemology and Pragmatic Encroachment’, Synthese, (forthcoming). (pdf)
  • 'Wittgenstein’s On Certainty as Pyrrhonism in Action’, Wittgensteinian (adj.): Looking at Things From the Viewpoint of Wittgenstein's Philosophy, (eds.) N. de Costa & S. Wuppuluri, (Dordrecht, Holland: Springer, forthcoming). (pdf)
  • ‘Extended Entitlement’ (with J. A. Carter), Epistemic Entitlement, (eds.) P. Graham & N. Pedersen, (Oxford UP, forthcoming). (pdf)
  • ‘Extended Cognition and Humility’, Routledge Handbook on Humility, (eds.) M. Alfano, M. Lynch &A. Tanesini, (Routledge, forthcoming). (pdf)
  • ‘Putnam on Radical Skepticism: Wittgenstein, Cavell, and Occasion-Sensitive Semantics’, Engaging Putnam, (eds.) J. Conant & S. Chakraborty, (Harvard UP, forthcoming). (pdf)
  • ‘On Hinge Epistemology’, Skepsis [invited submission; and to be translated into Portuguese in Hinge Epistemology, (eds.) M. N. Figueiredo & P. Smith, (São Paulo, Brazil: Associação Filosófica Scientiae Studia)]. (pdf)
  • ‘Epistemic Relativism and Epistemic Internalism’, Routledge Handbook to Relativism, (ed.) M. Kusch, (London: Routledge, forthcoming). (pdf)
  • ‘Colour, Scepticism and Epistemology’ (with C. Ranalli), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, (eds.) D. Brown & F. Macpherson, (Routledge, forthcoming). (pdf)
  • ‘Knowledge, Skill, and Virtue Epistemology’, Routledge Handbook of Skill and Expertise, (eds.) C. Pavese & E. Fridland, (Routledge, forthcoming). (pdf)
  • ‘Good News, Bad News, Fake News’, Epistemology of Fake News, (eds.) S. Bernecker, A. Flowerre & T. Grundman, (Oxford UP, forthcoming). (pdf)
  • ‘Pyrrhonism and Wittgensteinian Quietism’, Ancient Scepticism and Contemporary Philosophy, (eds.) L. Perissinotto & B. R. Cámara, (Milan, Italy: Mimesis International). (pdf)
  • ‘Skeptical Invariantism and the Source of Skepticism’, Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered (eds.) C. Kyriacou & K. Wallbridge, (London: Routledge, forthcoming). (pdf)
  • ‘Venturinha and Epistemic Vertigo’, (Symposium on Venturinha’s Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology), Philosophia (forthcoming).
  • ‘Précis of Epistemic Angst’ and ‘Epistemic Angst: Responses to My Critics’, Skepsis (as part of a special issue on my book, Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing), (forthcoming). 


  • ‘Cognitive Achievement and Environmental Luck: An Empirical Study’ (with J. A. Carter & J. Shepherd), Review of Philosophy and Psychology, (2019), [Online First, DOI:https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-018-0429-9]. (pdf
  • ‘The Epistemology of Cognitive Enhancement’ (with J. A. Carter), Journal of Medicine & Philosophy, 44 (2019), 220-42. (pdf)
  • ‘Contemporary Responses to Radical Scepticism’, Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945 to 2015, (eds.) K. Becker & I. Thomson, (Cambridge UP, 2019). (pdf)
  • ‘Modal Accounts of Luck’, The Routledge Handbook to Theories of Luck, (eds.) I. Church & R. Hartman, (Routledge, 2019). (pdf)
  • ‘Scepticism and Atheism’, Blackwell Companion to Atheism and Philosophy, (ed.) G. Oppy, (Blackwell, 2019). (pdf)
  • ‘Extended Self-Knowledge’ (with J. A. Carter), Third-Person Self-Knowledge, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative, (eds.) J. E. Kirsch & P. Pedrini, (Springer, 2019). (pdf)
  • ‘Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck’, Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology, (ed.) H. Battaly, (Routledge, 2019). (pdf)
  • ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’, New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism, (eds.) C. Doyle, J. Milburn & D. H. Pritchard, (Routledge, 2019). (pdf)
  • ‘The Analysis of Knowledge’, The Philosophy of Knowledge: A History, (eds.) S. Hetherington & M. Valaris, (Bloomsbury, 2019). (pdf)
  • ‘Disagreement, Intellectual Humility, and Reflection’, Thinking about Oneself: The Place and Value of Reflection in Philosophy and Psychology, (ed.) W. Da Silva Filho, chapter 5, (Springer, 2019). (pdf)


  • 'Epistemic Angst', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2018), 70-90. [Translated into Spanish as ‘La Angustia Epistémica’ by T. Verthen for Problemas Escépticos (‘Skeptical Problems’), (ed.) J. Ornelas]. (pdf)
  • ‘Legal Risk, Legal Evidence, and the Arithmetic of Criminal Justice’, Jurisprudence 9 (2018), 108-19. (NON-FINAL pdf)
  • 'Intellectual Humility and Disagreement',  Synthese (2018), [Online First, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02024-5]. (pdf)
  • ‘Extended Virtue Epistemology’, Inquiry 61 (2018), 632-47. (pdf)
  • ‘Neuromedia and the Epistemology of Education’, Metaphilosophy 49 (2018), 328-49; and to be reprinted in 'Connecting Virtues: Theoretical and Educational Insights', (eds.) M. Croce & M. S. Vaccarezza, (Blackwell, forthcoming). (pdf)
  • ‘Disagreement, of Belief and Otherwise’, Voicing Dissent, (ed.) C. Johnson, (Routledge, 2018). (pdf)
  • ‘Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology and Deep Disagreement’, TOPOI (2018),  [Online First, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-018-9612-y]. (pdf)
  • ‘Quasi-Fideism and Religious Conviction’, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion (pdf).
  • ‘The Gettier Problem and Epistemic Luck’, The Gettier Problem, (ed.) S. Hetherington, (Cambridge UP, 2018). (pdf)
  • ‘Unnatural Doubts’, Skeptical Solutions: Provocations of Philosophy, (eds.) G. A. Bruno & A. Rutherford, (Oxford University Press, 2018). (pdf)
  • ‘Precis of Epistemic Angst’ and ‘Responses to My Critics’, Manuscrito (as part of an invited symposium on my book Epistemic Angst), 41 (2018), 115-65. (pdfpdf)
  • 'Aesthetic Risk', Think 17 (2018), 1-14. (pdf)
  • 'Extended Knowledge', Extended Epistemology, (eds.) J. A. Carter, A. Clark, J. Kallestrup, S. O. Palermos & D. H. Pritchard, (Oxford UP, 2018). (pdf)
  • ‘Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Biscopic Treatment of Radical Scepticism’, The Factive Turn in Epistemology, (ed.) V. Mitova, (Cambridge UP, 2018). [Translated into Portugese by E. Carvalho, and published in Sképsis]. (pdf)
  • ‘The Value of Knowledge’ (with J. A. Carter & J. Turri), Stanford Encyclopædia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta (UPDATED 2018); [available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/].


  • ‘Epistemically Useful False Beliefs’, Philosophical Explorations 20 (2017), 4-20. (pdf)
  • ‘Wittgenstein on Hinges and Radical Scepticism in On Certainty’, Blackwell Companion to Wittgenstein, (eds.) H.-J. Glock & J. Hyman, 563-75, (Blackwell, 2017). (pdf)
  • ‘Epistemic Situationism, Epistemic Dependence, and the Epistemology of Education’ (with J. A. Carter), Epistemic Situationism, (eds.) M. Alfano & A. Fairweather, 168-91, (Oxford UP, 2017). (pdf)
  • 'Anti-Risk Epistemology and and Negative Epistemic Dependence’, Synthese (2017), [Online First, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1586-6]. (pdf)
  • ‘Cognitive Bias, Scepticism and Understanding’ (with J. A. Carter), Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and the Philosophy of Science, (eds.) S. Ammon, C. Baumberger, C. Beisbart, G. Brun & S. Grimm, 272-92, (Routledge, 2017). (pdf)
  • 'Faith and Reason', Philosophy [special issue on Religious Epistemology], 81 (2017), 101-18. (pdf)
  • ‘Epistemic Supervenience, Anti-Individualism and Knowledge-First Epistemology’ (with J. Kallestrup), Knowledge-First Epistemology, (eds.) J. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis, (Oxford UP, 2017). (pdf)
  • ‘Scepticism and Disjunctivism’ (with C. Ranalli), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, (eds.) D. Machuca & B. Reed, (Continuum, 2017). (pdf)
  • ‘Knowledge, Luck and Virtue: Resolving the Gettier Problem’, The Gettier Problem, (eds.) C. de Almeida, P. Klein & R. Borges, (Oxford UP, 2017). (pdf)
  • ‘Inference to the Best Explanation and Epistemic Circularity’ (with J. A. Carter), Best Explanations: New Essays on Inference to the Best Explanation, (eds.) K. McCain & T. Poston, (Oxford UP, 2017). (pdf)
  • ‘Intellectual Pride and Intellectual Humility’ (with J. Kallestrup), Pride, (eds.) J. A. Carter & E. Gordon, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017). (pdf)
  • 'Engel on Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value', Synthese 194 (2017), 1477–86. (pdf)
  • ‘Is There a Fundamental Tension Between Faith and Rationality?’,Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone(eds.) M. Harris &D. H. Pritchard, 53-61, (Routledge, 2017).
  • ‘How Do Scientific Claims Relate to the Truth?’ (with S. O Palermos), Philosophy, Science and Religion for Everyone(eds.) M. Harris &D. H. Pritchard, 4-15, (Routledge, 2017).


  • 'Epistemic Risk', Journal of Philosophy 113 (2016), 550-71. (pdf)
  • ‘Seeing It For Oneself: Perceptual Knowledge, Understanding, and Intellectual Autonomy’, Episteme 13 (2016), 29-42. (pdf)
  • ‘Perceptual Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives’ (with J. A. Carter), Philosophical Studies 173 (2016), 969-90. (pdf)
  • 'Epistemic Dependence', Philosophical Perspectives 30 (2016), 1-20. (pdf)
  • 'Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Defeat’, Synthese (2016), [Online First, DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1074-4]. (pdf)
  • ‘Epistemic Axiology’, Epistemic Reasons, Epistemic Norms, and Epistemic Goals, (eds.) M. Grajner & P. Schmechtig, 407-22, (DeGruyter, 2016). (pdf)
  • ‘Contextualism and Radical Scepticism’, Synthese (2016), [Online First, DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1122-0]. (pdf)
  • ‘Intellectual Virtue, Extended Cognition, and the Epistemology of Education’, Intellectual Virtues and Education: Essays In Applied Virtue Epistemology, (ed.) J. Baehr, 113-27, (Routledge, 2016). (pdf)
  • 'Intellectual Humility, Knowledge-How, and Disagreement’ (with J. A. Carter), The Virtue Turn, (eds.) M. Slote, E. Sosa & C. Mi, 49-63, (Routledge, 2016). (pdf)
  • ‘Dispositional Robust Virtue Epistemology versus Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’ (with J. Kallestrup), Performance Epistemology, (ed.) M. Fernandez, 31-50, (Oxford UP, 2016). (pdf)
  • ‘Propositional Epistemic Luck, Epistemic Risk, and Epistemic Justification’ (with P. Bondy), Synthese (2016), [Online First, DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1262-2]. (pdf)
  • 'The Sources of Scepticism’, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism [special issue on Hinge Epistemology: Basic Beliefs After Moore and Wittgenstein] 6 (2016), 203-27. (pdf)
  • 'Veritism and Epistemic Value', Alvin Goldman and His Critics, (eds.) H. Kornblith & B. McLaughlin, (Blackwell, 2016). (pdf
  • 'From Epistemic Anti-Individualism to Intellectual Humility' (with J. Kallestrup), Res Publica (special issue on Philosophy and Theology of Intellectual Humility, (eds.) J. Greco & E. Stump), 93 (2016), 533-52. (pdf)
  • 'Ignorance and Epistemic Value', The Epistemic Dimensions of Ignorance, (eds.) M. Blaauw & R. Peels, 132-43, (Cambridge UP, 2016). (pdf)
  • ‘Précis of Epistemological Disjunctivism’ and ‘Responses to My Critics’, Journal of Philosophical Research (as part of an invited symposium on my book Epistemological Disjunctivism), (2016) 41, 175-81 & 221-38. (pdf, pdf)
  • ‘Radical Scepticism and Brains in Vats’ (with C. Ranalli), Putnam on Brains in Vats, (ed.) S. Goldberg, (Cambridge UP, 2016). (pdf)
  • ‘On Metaepistemological Scepticism’ (with C. Ranalli), Traditional Epistemic Internalism, (eds.) M. Bergmann & B. Coppenger, (Oxford UP, 2016). (pdf)
  • 'The Distribution of Epistemic Agency' (with S. O. Palermos), Social Epistemology and Epistemic Agency: De-Centralizing Epistemic Agency, (ed.) P. Reider, (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016). (pdf)
  • ‘Knowledge, Luck, and Virtue’, Zi Ran Bian Zheng Fa Tong Xun [Journal of Dialectics of Nature] (commissioned), (2016). 


  • ‘Knowledge-How and Epistemic Luck’ (with J. A. Carter), Noûs 49 (2015), 440-53. (pdf)
  • ‘Knowledge-How and Cognitive Achievement’ (with J. A. Carter), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2015), 181-99. (pdf)
  • 'Knowledge-How and Epistemic Value' (with J. A. Carter), Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2015), 799-816. (pdf)
  • ‘Anti-Luck Epistemology and the Gettier Problem’, Philosophical Studies 172 (2015), 93-111. (pdf)
  • ‘Risk’, Metaphilosophy 46 (2015), 436-61. (pdf)
  • ‘Précis of Epistemological Disjunctivism’ and ‘Responses to My Critics’, Analysis (as part of an invited symposium on my book Epistemological Disjunctivism), 75 (2015), 598-95 & 627-37. (pdf, pdf)
  • 'Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason: The Influence of Newman', God, Truth and Other Enigmas (ed.) M. Szatkowski, 141-64, (Walter de Gruyter, 2015). (pdf)
  • ‘Die Methodologie der Erkenntnistheorie’, Erkenntnistheorie: Wie und Wozu?, (eds.) D. Koppelberg & S. Tolksdorf, 153-78, (Mentis, 2015).


  • 'Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth' (with J. Kallestrup), European Journal of Philosophy 22 (2014), 335-57. (pdf)
  • ‘Varieties of Externalism’ (with J. A. Carter, J. Kallestrup & O. Palermos), Philosophical Issues 24 (2014), 63-109. (pdf)
  • 'Knowledge and Understanding', Virtue Scientia: Bridges Between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, (ed.) A. Fairweather, 315-28, (Springer, 2014). (pdf)
  • ‘The Modal Account of Luck’, Metaphilosophy 45 (2014), 594-619; and reprinted in The Philosophy of Luck, (eds.) D. H. Pritchard & L. Whittington, (Wiley-Blackwell, 143-68). (pdf)
  • ‘Sceptical Intuitions’, Intuitions, (eds.) D. Rowbottom & T. Booth, 213-31, (Oxford UP, 2014). (pdf)
  • ‘Re-evaluating the Epistemic Situationist Challenge to Virtue Epistemology’, Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue, (eds.) A. Fairweather & O. Flanagan, 143-54, (Cambridge UP, 2014). (pdf)
  • 'Truth as the Fundamental Epistemic Good', The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social, (eds.) J. Matheson & R. Vitz, 112-29, (Oxford UP, 2014). (pdf)
  • 'Virtue Epistemology, Extended Cognition, and the Epistemology of Education', Universitas: Monthly Review of Philosophy and Culture [invited for special issue on Virtue Epistemology and Virtue Ethics] 478 (2014), 47-66. (pdf)
  • 'Entitlement and the Groundlessness of Our Believing', Contemporary Perspectives on Scepticism and Perceptual Justification, (eds.) D. Dodd & E. Zardini, ch. 10, (Oxford UP, 2014). (pdf)
  • 'Epistemic Luck, Safety, and Assertion', Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion, (eds.) C. Littlejohn & J. Turri, 155-72, (Oxford UP, 2014). (pdf)
  • ‘What is this Thing Called Science? A Very Brief Philosophical Overview’, (with M. Massimi), Philosophy and the Sciences for Everyone, (ed.) M. Massimi, 1-13, (Routledge, 2014).
  • ‘Zagzebski on Rationality’ (with S. Ryan), European Journal of Philosophy of Religion (invited symposium on Zagzebski’s Epistemic Authority), 6 (2014), 39-46. (pdf)


  • 'Davidson on Radical Skepticism', Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson, (eds.) E. LePore & K. Ludwig, (Blackwell, 2013). (pdf)
  • 'Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Dependence' (with J. Kallestrup), Knowledge, Virtue and Action: Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work, (eds.) T. Henning & D. Schweikard, (Routledge, 2013). (pdf)
  • ‘Epistemic Virtue and the Epistemology of Education’, Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2013), 236-47; reprinted in Education and the Growth of Knowledge: Perspectives From Social and Virtue Epistemology, (ed.) B. Kotzee, 92-105, (Blackwell, 2013). (pdf)
  • 'There Cannot be Lucky Knowledge', Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (2nd Ed.), (eds.) M. Steup, J. Turri & E. Sosa, (Blackwell, 2013). (pdf)
  • 'The Power, and Limitations, of Virtue Epistemology' (with J. Kallestrup), Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism, (eds.) J. Greco & R. Groff, (Routledge, 2013). (pdf)
  • 'Extended Knowledge and Social Epistemology' (with O. Palermos), Social Epistemology (2013). (link)
  • 'Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo' (with C. Boult), Philosophia 41 (2013), 27-35. (pdf)
  • 'Epistemic Paternalism and Epistemic Value', Philosophical Inquiries [invited submission] 1 (2013), 1-37. (pdf)
  • ‘Rorty, Williams and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology’ (with C. Ranalli), Humanities [invited for special issue on Richard Rorty] 2 (2013), 351-68. (pdf)


  • 'Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’, Journal of Philosophy 109 (2012), 247-79; and reprinted in Epistemology: Major Works, (ed.) R. Neta, (Routledge, 2012). (pdf)
  • 'Wittgenstein and the Groundlessness of Our Believing', Synthese 189 (2012), 255-72. (pdf)
  • 'Robust Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Anti-Individualism' (with J. Kallestrup), Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2012), 84-103. (pdf)
  • 'In Defence of Modest Anti-Luck Epistemology', The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology, (eds.) T. Black & K. Becker, 173-92, (Cambridge UP, 2012). (pdf)
  • 'Disagreement, Scepticism, and Track-Record Arguments', Disagreement and Scepticism, (ed.) D. Machuca, (Routledge, 2012). (pdf)
  • 'Hume on Miracles’ (with A. Richmond), Continuum Companion to Hume, (eds.) A. Bailey & D. O’Brien, 227-45, (Continuum, 2012).(pdf)
  • 'On Meta-Epistemology’, Harvard Review of Philosophy 18 (2012), 91-108. (pdf)
  • ‘Two Conceptions of Radical Scepticism’, Ámbitos 28 (2012), 13-20.


  • 'The Value of Knowledge' (updated version with J. Turri), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta, (2011).
  • 'Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Basis Problem', Philosophical Issues (supplement to Nous) 21 (2011), 434-55. (pdf)
  • 'Wittgenstein on Scepticism', Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, (eds.) O. Kuusela & M. McGinn, (Oxford UP, 2011). (pdf)
  • 'What is the Swamping Problem?', Reasons for Belief, (eds.) A. Reisner & A. Steglich-Petersen, (Cambridge UP, 2011). (pdf)
  • 'Evidentialism, Internalism, Disjunctivism', Evidentialism and its Discontents, (ed.) T. Dougherty, (Oxford UP, 2011). (pdf)
  • 'The Genealogy of the Concept of Knowledge and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology', Der Begriff des Wissens/The Concept of Knowledge, (ed.) S. Tolksdorf, (de Gruyter, 2011). (pdf)
  • 'Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism', Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion 4 (2011), 145-59. (NON-FINAL pdf)
  • 'Wittgensteinian Pyrrhonism', Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern and Contemporary Philosophy, (ed.) D. Machuca, (Springer, 2011). (pdf)
  • 'Die Methodologie der Erkenntnistheorie', Erkenntnistheorie: Wie und Wozu?, (eds.) D. Koppelberg & S. Tolksdorf, (Mentis, 2011).
  • 'Skepticism and Information' (with E. T. Kerr), Luciano Floridi’s Philosophy of Technology, (ed.) H. Demir, (Springer, 2011).


  • 'Cognitive Ability and the Extended Cognition Thesis', Synthese 175 (2010), 133-51. (pdf)
  • 'Epistemic Relativism, Epistemic Incommensurability and Wittgensteinian Epistemology', Blackwell Companion to Relativism, (ed.) S. Hales, (Blackwell, 2010). (NON-FINAL pdf)
  • 'Relevant Alternatives, Perceptual Knowledge and Discrimination', Noûs 44 (2010), 245-68. (pdf)
  • 'Absurdity, Angst and the Meaning of Life', Monist 93 (2010), 3-16. (pdf)
  • 'Achievements, Luck and Value', Think 25 (2010), 1-12. (pdf)
  • 'Religious Belief, Epistemology of', Oxford Bibliographies: Philosophy (2010 [updated 2013]). (pdf)
  • 'Skepticism, Contemporary', Oxford Bibliographies: Philosophy (2010 [updated 2013]). (pdf)
  • 'Testimony, Epistemology of' (with J. A. Carter), Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy (2010). (pdf)


  • 'Defusing Epistemic Relativism', Synthese 169 (2009), 397-412. (pdf)
  • 'Scepticism and the Possibility of Knowledge', Analysis 69 (2009), 317-25. (pdf)
  • 'The Value of Knowledge', Harvard Review of Philosophy 16 (2009), 2-19. (pdf)
  • 'Wright Contra McDowell on Perceptual Knowledge and Scepticism', Synthese 171 (2009), 467-79. (pdf)
  • 'Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value', Epistemology (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures), (ed.) A. O'Hear, 19-43, (Cambridge UP, 2009). (pdf)
  • 'Two Deflationary Approaches to Fitch-Style Reasoning' (with C. Kelp), New Essays on the Paradox of Knowability, (ed.) J. Salerno, 324-38, (Oxford UP, 2009). (pdf)
  • 'Knowledge', Central Issues of Philosophy, (ed.) J. Shand, 24-36, (Blackwell, 2009). (pdf)
  • 'Apt Performance and Epistemic Value', Philosophical Studies 143 (2009), 407-16. (pdf)
  • 'Knowledge and Virtue: Response to Kelp', International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (2009), 589-96. (pdf)
  • 'Safety-Based Epistemology: Whither Now?', Journal of Philosophical Research 34 (2009), 33-45. (pdf)


  • 'Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Value', Proceedings and Addresses of the Aristotelian Society (suppl. vol.) 82 (2008), 19-41. (pdf)
  • 'Greco on Knowledge: Virtues, Contexts, Achievements', Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2008), 437-47. (pdf)
  • 'Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology', Oxford Handbook of Scepticism, (ed.) J. Greco, 437-55, (Oxford UP, 2008). (pdf)
  • 'McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism', New Essays on Disjunctivism, (eds.) A. Haddock, F. Macpherson, 283-310, (Oxford UP, 2008). (pdf)
  • 'Knowing the Answer, Understanding and Epistemic Value', Grazer Philosophische  Studien 77 (2008), 325-39. (pdf)
  • 'Contrastivism, Evidence, and Scepticism', Social Epistemology, 22 (2008), 305-23. (pdf)
  • 'Certainty and Scepticism', Philosophical Issues (supplement to Noûs) 18 (2008), 58-67. (pdf)
  • 'Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Revisited', Metaphilosophy 39 (2008), 66-88. (pdf)
  • 'A Defence of Quasi-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony', Philosophica 78 (2008), 13-28. (pdf)


  • 'Recent Work on Epistemic Value', American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2007), 85-110. (pdf)
  • 'McDowell and the New Evil Genius' (with R. Neta), Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007), 381-96. (pdf)
  • 'Anti-Luck Epistemology', Synthese 158 (2007), 277-97. (pdf)
  • 'How to be a Neo-Moorean', Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, (ed.) S. Goldberg, (Oxford UP, 2007). (pdf)
  • 'The Value of Knowledge', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta, (2007).
  • 'Knowledge, Luck, and Lotteries', New Waves in Epistemology, (eds.) D. H. Pritchard & V. Hendricks, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). (pdf)


  • 'Greco on Reliabilism and Epistemic Luck', Philosophical Studies 116 (2006). (pdf)
  • 'Moral and Epistemic Luck', Metaphilosophy 37 (2006), 1-25. (pdf)


  • 'Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Angst', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2005), 185-206. (pdf)
  • 'The Structure of Sceptical Arguments', Philosophical Quarterly 55 (2005), 37-52. (pdf)
  • 'Contextualism, Scepticism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres', Knowledge and Skepticism, (eds.) J. Keim-Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. Silverstein, (MIT Press, 2005). (pdf)
  • 'Wittgenstein's On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-Scepticism', Investigating On Certainty: Essays on Wittgenstein's Last Work, (eds.) D. Moyal-Sharrock & W. H. Brenner, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). (pdf)
  • 'Virtue Epistemology and the Acquisition of Knowledge', Philosophical Explorations 8 (2005), 229-43. (pdf)
  • 'Neo-Mooreanism versus Contextualism', Grazer Philosophische Studien (special issue on Contextualism), 67 (2005), 20-43. (pdf)
  • 'Greco on Scepticism' (with C. van Putten), Erkenntnis 62 (2005), 277-84. (pdf)
  • 'Neo-Mooreanism, Contextualism, and the Evidential Basis of Scepticism', Contextualism, (ed.) D. Suster, 3-25, (Rutgers UP, 2005). (pdf)


  • 'The Epistemology of Testimony', Philosophical Issues (supplement to Nous) 14 (2004), 326-48. (pdf)
  • 'Epistemic Deflationism', Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2004), 1-32. (pdf)
  • 'Epistemic Luck', Journal of Philosophical Research 29 (2004), 193-222. (pdf)
  • 'The Psychology and Philosophy of Luck' (with M. Smith), New Ideas in Psychology 22 (2004), 1-28. (pdf)
  • 'Testimony', The Trial on Trial: Truth and Due Process, (eds.) R. A. Duff, L. Farmer, S. Marshall & V. Tadros, (Hart, 2004). (pdf)
  • 'An Argument for the Inconsistency of Content Externalism and Epistemic Internalism' (with J. Kallestrup), Philosophia 31 (2004), 345-54. (pdf)
  • 'Some Recent Work in Epistemology', Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004), 605-13. (pdf)


  • 'McDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism', European Journal of Philosophy 11 (2003), 273-94. (pdf)
  • 'Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck', Metaphilosophy 34 (2003), 106-30. (pdf)
  • 'Reforming Reformed Epistemology', International Philosophical Quarterly 43 (2003), 43-66; and reprinted in The Epistemology of Basic Belief, (eds.) R. Rood & R. van Woudenberg, (Rodopi, 2004). (pdf)


  • 'Recent Work on Radical Skepticism', American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (2002), 215-57. (pdf)
  • 'McKinsey Paradoxes, Radical Scepticism, and the Transmission of Knowledge across Known Entailments', Synthese 130 (2002), 279-302. (pdf)
  • 'Resurrecting the Moorean Response to Scepticism', International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (2002), 283-307. (pdf)
  • 'Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism and Closure', Theoria 69 (2002), 129-61. (pdf)
  • 'Two Forms of Epistemological Contextualism', Grazer Philosophische Studien 64 (2002), 19-55. (pdf)
  • 'Contextualism, Scepticism, and the Problem of Epistemic Descent', Dialectica 55 (2002), 327-49. (pdf)
  • 'Skepticism, Contemporary', Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (eds.) B. Dowden & J. Fieser, (2002).


  • 'Scepticism and Dreaming', Philosophia 28 (2001), 373-90. (pdf)
  • 'Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and "Hinge" Propositions', Wittgenstein-Jahrbuch 2001/2002, (ed.) D. Salehi, (Peter Lang, 2001). (pdf)
  • 'The Opacity of Knowledge', Essays in Philosophy 2.1 (2001), (link) (pdf)


  • 'Closure and Context', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2000), 275-80. (pdf)
  • 'Is "God Exists" a "Hinge" Proposition of Religious Belief?', International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (2000), 129-40. (pdf)
  • 'Doubt Undogmatized: Pyrrhonian Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and the 'Metaepistemological' Challenge', Principia—Revista Internacional de Epistemologia 4 (2000), 187-214. (pdf)

Professional service

Referee work

  • Acta Analytica
  • Acumen Press
  • American Philosophical Quarterly
  • Ashgate Press
  • Australasian Journal of Philosophy
  • Blackwell Press
  • Broadview Press
  • British Journal for the History of Philosophy
  • The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • British Society for Ethical Theory
  • Canadian Journal of Philosophy
  • Canadian Philosophical Association
  • Cambridge University Press
  • Central States Philosophical Association
  • Continuum Press
  • Critica
  • Dialectica
  • Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review
  • Discipline Filosofiche
  • Edinburgh University Press
  • Education Research International
  • Episteme
  • Ergo
  • Erkenntnis
  • Ethical Perspectives
  • Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
  • Ethics
  • European Congress of Analytic Philosophy
  • European Journal of Analytical Philosophy
  • European Journal of Philosophy
  • European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
  • Grazer Philosophische Studien
  • Inquiry
  • Journal of the American Philosophical Association
  • Journal of Applied Philosophy
  • Journal of Languages and Culture
  • Journal of Leeds Undergraduate Philosophy Society
  • Journal of Moral Philosophy
  • Journal of the Philosophy of History
  • Journal of Philosophical Research
  • Journal of Philosophy
  • Journal of the American Philosophical Association
  • Kluwer Press
  • Les Ateliers de l'Éthique
  • Logique et Analyse
  • Metaphilosophy
  • Mind
  • MIT Press
  • Nordic Wittgenstein Review
  • NTU Philosophical Review
  • Oxford University Press
  • Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
  • Palgrave Macmillan Press
  • Philosopher's Imprint
  • Philosophia
  • Philosophica
  • The Philosophical Quarterly
  • Philosophical Explorations
  • Philosophical Papers
  • Philosophical Psychology
  • Philosophical Studies
  • Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
  • Philosophy and Technology
  • Philosophy at Yeditepe
  • Philosophy Compass
  • Philosophy of Science
  • Polish Journal of Philosophy
  • Polity Press
  • Princeton University Press
  • Principia
  • Ratio
  • Res Philosophica
  • The Review of Philosophy and Psychology
  • Routledge Press
  • Social Epistemology
  • The Southern Journal of Philosophy
  • Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology
  • Synthese
  • Theoria
  • Thought

Other professional activities

  • Associate Fellow of the Northern Institute of Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen, and of the Arche Research Centre at the University of St. Andrews.
  • Affiliated Researcher of the Social Epistemology Research Group at the University of Copenhagen. 
  • Honorary Professor at the International Center for Formal Ontology, Warsaw University of Technology.
  • Elected Member of the British Philosophical Association Executive Committee (2005-08).
  • Member of the AHRC Review College (since 2007).
  • Member of the ESF Humanities Disciplinary Panel (since 2012).
  • Member of the Carnegie Trust Research Assessor Panel (since 2014).
  • Member of the editorial boards of The Philosophical Quarterly, Synthese, Episteme, Philosophy Compass, Metaphilosophy, Thought, Disputatio, Continuum Critical Introductions to Contemporary Epistemology, Rowman & Littlefield Moral Emotions Series, Humanities, Critical Inquiries, Philosophical Inquiries, Journal of General Philosophy, International Journal of Philosophy Study, Cogent OA: Arts and Humanities, Logos & Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology, Discoveries, and Cilicia Journal of Philosophy.
  • Leiter Report evaluator.
  • External examiner for the Philosophy Departments at the Universities of Glasgow (2004-09) and Aberdeen (2005-10).
  • Member of the Society for Skeptical Studies, the International Society for the Study of Skepticism, and International Associate member of the American Philosophical Association.
  • Founding member of the European Epistemology Network.
  • Chair and Convenor of the Royal Society of Edinburgh’s Philosophy, Theology and Law Sectional Committee (2016-19).
  • Member of the Royal Society of Edinburgh's Philosophy, Theology and Law Sectional Committee (2011-14).
  • Member of the Royal Society of Edinburgh's CRF European Fellowship Committee (from 2014).
  • Member of the International Advisory Board of the PERFECT ERC Research Project.
  • Subject area editor (epistemology) for Routledge Encyclopædia of Philosophy.
  • Philosophy editor for Academia. 

Visiting Professorships

  • Tang Chun-I Distinguished Visiting Professor, Chinese University of Hong Kong (deferred).
  • University of Connecticut, 2016.
  • Annual LOGOS Philosophy Masterclass Visiting Professor, University of Barcelona, 2016.
  • Annual Soochow Lectures in Philosophy, Soochow University, Taipei, 2013.
  • Annual Cologne Summer School Visiting Professor, University of Cologne, 2013.
  • University of Helskinki, 2009.
  • University of Aarhus (Denmark), 2005.

Administrative Roles

Undergraduate teaching

Epistemology, Logic, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Religion, Axiology, Wittgenstein

Current PhD students supervised

Research summary

Duncan's research is mainly in epistemology with particular focus on the following issues: the problem of scepticism, the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction; the rationality of religious belief; testimony; the relationship between epistemic and content externalism; virtue epistemology; epistemic value; modal epistemology; the history of scepticism; and epistemological contextualism. His principal monographs are Epistemic Luck (Oxford UP, hardback 2005, paperback 2007), The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations (co-authored with Adrian Haddock and Alan Millar, Oxford UP, hardback 2010, paperback 2012), Epistemological Disjunctivism (Oxford UP, hardback 2012, paperback 2014), and Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing (Princeton UP, 2015). 

Duncan is also the author of Knowledge (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 1st ed. 2006, 2nd ed. 2009), Epistemology A-Z (Edinburgh UP/Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, with M. Blaauw), and editor or co-editor of more than a dozen volumes and journal special issues (for more details about Duncan's publication record, see below). He is the editor-in-chief of Oxford Bibliographies: Philosophy and (with Diego Machuca) International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, and he is the series editor of three book series: New Waves in PhilosophyPalgrave Innovations in Philosophy (both with Vincent Hendricks) and Brill Studies in Skepticism (with Diego Machuca). He also administers the weblog, Epistemic Value.

Aside from epistemology, Duncan is also interested in the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mind and language, the philosophy of religion, and, increasingly, ethics and value theory.

Duncan is part of the Department of Philosophy's Epistemology research cluster, and is Director of the new Eidyn research centre. He is also currently leading a several research projects as part of this centre, including a major AHRC-funded project (c. £510K) on 'Extended Knowledge', and three Templeton-funded projects, Philosophy, Science and Religion Online (c. £1.5M), 'Intellectual Humility MOOC' (c. £400K), and 'Virtue Epistemology, Epistemic Dependence, and Epistemic Humility' (c. £100K). He also leads the Edinburgh component of the European-wide DIAPHORA research network (European Commission Marie SkÅ‚odowska-Curie ITN European Training Network grant, c. €3.7M). 

Click here for his Google Scholar Profile. If you want to know what will eventually cause his demise, click here. Duncan contributes to the University of Edinburgh's new MOOCs (Massive Open Online Courses) in Introduction to Philosophy and Philosophy and the Sciences. He's also one of the people behind the new Eidyn-led online MSc in Epistemology, Ethics and Mind. To listen to a BPPA talk he gave on getting published, click here. To see a recent lecture he gave in Bonn on radical scepticism, click here. To see his 'research in a nutshell' video, click here. Oddly, for someone who hasn't published much at the formal end of philosophy, Duncan has an ErdÅ‘s number (7). 

Research Interests