PPIG: Philosophy, Psychology, and Informatics Group

Mental Actions and Cognitive Phenomenology

Of main interest to the workshop is the role of cognitive phenomenology in the performance of mental actions. Mental actions can be understood in terms of agents and their cognitive capacities. When an agent performs a mental action, she employs one or more of her cognitive capacities and thereby produces an effect of some kind. The central concern of the cognitive phenomenology debate is whether there is a distinctive phenomenology of cognition, that is, a kind of phenomenology that has conceptual or cognitive character in some sense that needs to be precisely determined. Does initiating, guiding, or terminating mental actions involve a particular phenomenal character? If so, what is the basis of this phenomenal character?

Speakers

• Jesse Prinz (City University of New York)
• Carrie Figdor (University of Iowa)
• Santiago Arango-Muñoz (University of Antioquia)
• Tom McClelland (University of Warwick)
• Sophie Keeling (University of Edinburgh)
• John Dorsch (University of Edinburgh)

Program 

Further Information

This workshop is generously sponsored by the Eidyn Research Centre; the Philosophy, Psychology, and Informatics Group; and the University of Edinburgh.

• Philosophy, Psychology, and Informatics Group
• Eidyn Research Centre
• University of Edinburgh

Organizers

John Dorsch

Contact

John Dorsch