PPIG: Philosophy, Psychology, and Informatics Group

Presenter: Richard Moore (Berlin School of Mind and Brain, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)

Title: Non-Natural Pedagogy

Abstract: Gergely and Csibra (e.g., Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Csibra, 2010) have argued that humans possess an adaptation for learning from teaching, which they call natural pedagogy. Part of this adaptation consists of our being hardwired to interpret a small range of ostensive signals – including eye contact and ‘motherese’ – as indicating to an audience that a speaker is acting with communicative intent. However, despite a wealth of valuable studies illustrating a possible role for ostension in cognitive development (e.g., Senju & Csibra, 2008; Leekam, Solomon & Teo, 2010), the precise function of ostensive signals remains unclear.

A key claim in the literature is that ostensive behaviours give expression to Gricean second clause (or ‘communicative’) intentions. However, the relationship of behaviours to intentions is indirect. For example, in many cases of communicative interaction familiar ostensive signals (like eye contact and directed speech) are absent; and the fact that someone is communicating is likely to be inferred from context, or from the content of what is said (Moore, Liebal & Tomasello, 2013; Moore, Mueller, Kaminski & Tomasello, 2015). In this case, ostensive behaviours cannot be necessary for the expression of Gricean intentions. Additionally, since one might produce ostensive signals even in the absence of communicative intentions, then the presence of ostensive signals cannot be sufficient to indicate communicative intent (Moore, Liebal & Tomasello, 2013; Moore, Mueller, Kaminski & Tomasello, 2015). This is true for both ostensive signals like eye contact and for words.

I will argue that, given these considerations, ostensive signals are best understood as reliable but fallible indicators that a speaker is acting with communicative intent. That is, ostensive signals might function as cases of what Grice (1957) called natural meaning; and not just as expressions of the second clause intentions of Grice’s account of non-natural meaning. This weaker construal of the functional role of ostension in communication is consistent with the possibility that young children’s expectations about ostensive signals are acquired through experience, and are not hardwired in the manner that Csibra and Gergely have claimed. The conclusion that this element of natural pedagogy is an adaptation is therefore unsupported.