

Topics in Mind and Cognition 2019— 2020.

PHIL10174

Dr. J. Suilin Lavelle

People

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Office hours

My office is in the Dugald Stewart Building, 5.07, and office hours are Tuesdays 11.30 – 12.30. There will not be regular office hours after Tuesday 3 December, but you can make an appointment to come to see me.

Office hours are a good time for you to come and discuss ideas for your essays. Please don't think you need a 'problem' to come to office hours; I am always willing to use this time to chat through any thoughts you may be having about topics covered in the course, or topics for your essays. But of course, if you have a problem, then do come to office hours to talk about it!

Syllabus

Week 1	Personal and sub-personal levels of explanation
Week 2	Representational theory of mind
Week 3	Mental content (1)
Week 4	Mental content 2
Week 5	Doing without representations
Week 6	Hypothesis of extended cognition
Week 7	Consciousness 1
Week 8	Consciousness 2
Week 9	Animal minds
Week 10	Cultural minds
Week 11	Review

Assessment

Mid-term essay	1500 words	35%	Essay questions published Wednesday 2 October	Thursday 24 October, by 12pm
Final essay	2000 words	65%	Essay questions published Wednesday 30 October	Thursday 12 December, by 12 pm

Tutorials

Tutorials will begin on Tuesday 23 September. I will circulate questions for you to prepare prior to tutorials, which will guide our discussions.

Readings

1. Personal and sub-personal levels of explanation

Required Reading

Drayson, Zoë (2012). The uses and abuses of the personal/subpersonal distinction. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 26, 1-18.

Secondary Reading

Dennett, Daniel. "Personal and sub-personal levels of explanation." reprinted in J. Bermudez (Ed) *Philosophy of Psychology: contemporary readings* (Routledge 2006).

2. Representational theory of mind

Revise from *Mind, Matter and Language 1819*

- Lectures 22 – 24, Functionalism and multiple realisability

Required Reading

Antony, Louise. (2009). Thinking. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind*. OUP Oxford

Secondary Reading

Antony, Louise (2007) Everybody has got it: a defence of non-reductive materialism. In B. McLaughlin & J. Cohen (Eds.) *Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind*. (160 – 181) Blackwells.

Clark, Andy. (2001). *Mindware: an introduction to Philosophy of Cognitive Science*. Oxford University Press. ch.1 & 2

[Fodor, Jerry. (1987). Mental Representation: an introduction. In N. Rescher, *Scientific Enquiry in Philosophical Perspective* (pp. 105 - 128). University Press of America]*

Von Eckardt, Barbara (2012). The representational theory of mind. In Keith Frankish & William Ramsey (eds.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science*. Cambridge University Press

*Possible reading; at the time of publishing the syllabus it is unclear if the library can access it.

3. Mental content (1): Fodor's causal theory

Required reading

Baker, Lynne Rudder (1989). On a causal theory of content. *Philosophical Perspectives* 3:165-186.

Fodor, Jerry (1987). "Meaning and the World Order" in his *Psychosemantics*, pp. 97-127 (MIT Press).

NB: read the Fodor first, then the Rudder-Baker.

4. Mental content (2): Teleological theories

Required reading

Neander, Karen (2007). Teleological Theories of Mental Content: Can Darwin Solve the Problem of Intentionality? In Michael Ruse (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Biology*. Oxford University Press. Sections 1-8 (inclusive).

Secondary reading (for both weeks)

Millikan, R. G. (1990). Compare and contrast Dretske, Fodor, and Millikan on teleosemantics. *Philosophical Topics*, 18(2), 151-161.

Orlandi, Nico (2014) *The Innocent Eye*. OUP. (Section 3.3) [Also relevant for 'Doing without representations']

Rowlands, Mark. *Teleosemantics*. <http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/teleo.html>

Rupert, Robert (2008). Causal theories of mental content. *Philosophy Compass*, 3(2), 353-380.

5. Doing without representations?

Required reading

Shapiro, Lawrence. (2011). *Embodied Cognition*. Routledge. Ch. 5

Secondary reading

Clark, Andy and Toribio, Josefa. (1994). Doing without representing?. *Synthese*, 101(3), 401-431.

Grush, Rick. (2003) In Defence of Some Cartesian Assumptions Concerning the Brain and its Operations *Biology and Philosophy* 18, 53 – 93

Spaulding, Shannon (2010) Embodied cognition and mindreading. *Mind & Language*, 25(1), 119-140 [Note, this critiques embodied cognition as it applies to a specific issue, namely, how we think about other people's thoughts. It's a specific application of the more general critiques of the EC programme.]

Van Gelder, Tim (1995) What might cognition be if not computation? *Journal of Philosophy* 92, 345-81

6. Hypothesis of extended cognition

Primary reading

Clark, Andy and Chalmers, David (1998) The Extended Mind. *Analysis* 58 . 10-23:

Sprevak, Mark (2009) "Extended Cognition and Functionalism." *Journal of Philosophy* 106. 503-27

Secondary reading

Gertler, Brie (2007) Over-extending the mind. In Gertler and Shapiro (Eds.) *Arguing about the Mind*. Routledge.

Rupert, Robert. (2004). Challenges to the hypothesis of the extended mind. *Journal of Philosophy*, 101, pp.389 – 428.

Shapiro, Lawrence. (2011). *Embodied Cognition*. Ch. 3 & 6. Routledge

7. Consciousness (1): What is it?

Primary reading

Block, Ned (2008). Consciousness and cognitive access. In *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (Vol. 108) pp. 289-317). Oxford University Press.

Secondary reading

Block, Ned. (2007). Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. *Behavioural and Brain Sciences*, 30, pp.481 – 503

[Burge, Tyler (2007) Reflections on Two Kinds of Consciousness. In his *Foundations of mind: philosophical essays, vol. 2.*]*

Churchland, Patricia (1988) What should we expect from a theory of consciousness? In Lycan and Prinz (Eds.) *Mind and Cognition*. Blackwell. pp. 583 – 594

Drayson, Zoe. (2015) The philosophy of phenomenal consciousness. In Miller (Ed.) *Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness : Toward a science and theory*. John Benjamins publishing company. (Relevant also for next week)

Irvine, Liz, and Sprevak, Mark. (forthcoming) Eliminativism about consciousness. In Uriah Kreigel (Ed.) *Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness*. Available: <https://marksprevak.com/publications/eliminativism-about-consciousness/>

*Possible reading, library access pending.

8. Consciousness (2): Higher order representational theories

Primary reading

Rosenthal, David (2011) Higher-order theories of consciousness. In Mclaughlin, Beckermann and Walter (Eds) *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind*. pp.239 - 252

Secondary reading

Block, Ned. (2009) Comparing the major theories of consciousness. In Gazzaniga, M. (Ed) *The cognitive neurosciences, vol. IV*. MIT Press. (Available through MIT Cognet, access through the library).

Kim, J. (2006). *Philosophy of Mind*. Westview. Pp. 216 - 220

Lycan, William (2004) The superiority of HOP to HOT. In Lycan and Prinz (Eds.) *Mind and Cognition*. Blackwell. pp. 617 - 629

9. Animal minds

Primary reading

Andrews, Kristin. (2014). *The animal mind: An introduction to the philosophy of animal cognition*. Routledge. Chapters 2 and 3.

Secondary reading

Allen, Colin. & Beckoff, Marc. (1997). *Species of Mind: The philosophy and biology of cognitive ethology* Cambridge, MIT Press. Especially Chapters 5 and 6, but all chapters are relevant.

Beck, Jacob. (2013). Why we can't say what animals think. *Philosophical Psychology*, 26(4), 520-546.

Carruthers, Peter. (2005). Why the question of animal consciousness might not matter very much. *Philosophical Psychology*, 18(1), 83-102.

Fitzpatrick, Simon. (2009). The primate mindreading controversy: a case study in simplicity and methodology in animal psychology. In R. Lurz (Ed.), *The philosophy of animal minds* (pp. 224 - 246). Cambridge University Press.

10. Cultural minds

Primary reading

Henrich, Joseph., Heine, Steven., & Norenzayan, Ara. (2010). The weirdest people in the world? *Brain and Behavioural Science*, 33, 61 – 83

Secondary reading

Barrett, H. Clark. (2006). Modularity and design reincarnation. In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, & S. Stich, (Eds.) *The innate mind vol. 2: Culture and cognition*. Pp. 199-217. Oxford University Press.

Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2006). Toward a psychological science for a cultural species. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 1(3), 251-269.

Lavelle, J. Suilin (forthcoming) The impact of culture on mindreading

Nisbett, Richard., Peng, Kai., Choi, I., and Norenzayan, Ara. (2001). Culture and Systems of Thought: Holistic versus Analytic Cognition. *Psychological Review*, 108, 291 – 310

Norenzayan, Ara., & Heine, Steven (2005). Psychological universals: What are they and how can we know? *Psychological bulletin*, 131(5), 763.

11. Review