Philosophy of Language
2018-2019
Semester 1

Seminar:
Wednesday 11.00-13.00. Room S1, 7 George Square.

Tutorials:
Begin Week 2.

Instructors:
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Course Secretary:
Ann-Marie Cowe (annmarie.cowe@ed.ac.uk)

Description: This intermediate course in philosophy of language explores topics in the philosophy of language in greater depth than in Mind, Matter, and Language. In 2018-19, we will focus on the relationship between what speakers think and the language they use to express their thoughts. Which elements of a sentence correspond to the thought it is used to express? To what extent does the thought expressed by a sentence depend on the context in which it is uttered? Which elements are used to convey tone, emotional content, or presuppositions? We will explore topics including: singular and general reference to objects in thought and language, context sensitivity and first-person thought, and presupposition. We will then put these theoretical tools to use by discussing political language.

Assessment:
Midterm Essay (35%)
Max: 1500 words. Thursday 25th October 2018, 12pm

Final Essay (60%)
Max: 2500 words. Thursday 13th December 2018, 12pm

Please see the LEARN page for possible Midterm and Final essay topics and instructions for approval if you want to choose your own topic.

Tutorial Participation (5%)
For 5 weeks of your choice, you must turn in a paper question or comment about the reading during Seminar. The question or comment must be typed and must include your student number. These topics will then be discussed in tutorial. The question or comment should be under 300 words. Please keep in mind that a 3 corresponds to a very high mark of 75.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mark</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Makes a novel or important point or asks a novel or important question that can significantly advance our understanding of the issues discussed in the text.</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Asks a question or makes a point that can clarify a point in the text liable to cause confusion.</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Asks a question or makes a point salient to the text, but not likely to advance understanding.</td>
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<td>Demonstrates little engagement with the text.</td>
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Peer Feedback and Autonomous Learning Groups

Bryan will arrange peer feedback through Autonomous Learning Groups. Students have until week 2 to register themselves. Otherwise, they will automatically be registered. Students will fill out Outline Frames. During week 4, the outline frames can be posted on the webpage associated with the Autonomous Learning Group. Bryan will look over the feedback of anyone who submits an outline frame through this mechanism. The idea would be that the group members exchange outlines and then have a group meeting to discuss what they like and what confused them. The students are then encouraged to exchange drafts of papers.

It is essential that you do the core reading in advance of seminar.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Core Reading</th>
<th>Themes</th>
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| Week 1: 19 September Thought in a truth conditional setting | Donald Davidson, “Truth and Meaning” [https://philpapers.org/rec/DAVTAM-3](https://philpapers.org/rec/DAVTAM-3) | • Aims of a semantic theory:  
  ○ Representation  
  ○ Competence  
  • Compositional semantics  
  • Truth conditional semantics  
  • Context Sensitivity in a truth theory |
|       | Irene Heim & Angelica Kratzer, *Semantics in a Generative Grammar* §§1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.12 [https://philpapers.org/rec/HEJSIG](https://philpapers.org/rec/HEJSIG) |        |
| Week 2: 26 September | Gottlob Frege, “On Sense and Reference” | • Reference and cognitive value  
  • Substitution *salva veritate* attitude |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sense and reference</th>
<th>(<a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/FREOSA-2">https://philpapers.org/rec/FREOSA-2</a>)</th>
<th>contexts</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>- Quotation</td>
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<td>- Reference shift semantics</td>
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<td>- Opacity and quantification</td>
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<td>Week 3: 3 October</td>
<td>Bertrand Russell, &quot;Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description&quot; (<a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/RUSKBA-4">https://philpapers.org/rec/RUSKBA-4</a>)</td>
<td>Propositions as the referents of sentences</td>
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<td>Acquaintance and description</td>
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<td>- The problem of complex singular terms</td>
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<td>- Singular and general thought</td>
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<td>- The theory of descriptions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Descriptive theories of names</td>
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<td>- Semantic content and successful communication</td>
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<td>Week 4: 10 October</td>
<td>Susan Stebbing, <em>A Modern Introduction to Logic</em>, Chapter 2, &quot;Language&quot;, §§1-2. (Scan)</td>
<td>Reference and identifying descriptions</td>
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<td>The new theory of reference</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Attributive and referential uses of descriptions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Keith Donnellan, “Reference and definite descriptions” (<a href="https://philpapers.org/rec/DONRAD-2">https://philpapers.org/rec/DONRAD-2</a>)</td>
<td>- The problem of ignorance and error</td>
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<td>- The problem of quantification into opaque constructions</td>
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</table>
| Week 7: 31 October | David Kaplan, *Selections* from “Demonstratives” Preface, §§I-VI, IX, XVII | • Problems for Fregean theories of demonstratives  
• Sense and direct reference  
• Character and content  
• Logic of demonstratives |
| --- | --- | --- |
Kent Bach, “Paving the Road to Reference” (https://philpapers.org/rec/BACPTR) | • Demonstratives, Demonstrations, and *Demonstrata*  
• Speaker intension theories  
• Demonstration theories  
• The Carnap/Agnew case |
| Week 9: 14 November | Francois Recanati, “What is said” (https://philpapers.org/rec/RECWIS) | • Unarticulated Constituents   
  o Gradable adjectives   
  o Quantifier domain restriction   
  o Travis cases   
• Arguments   
  o Under determinacy of meaning and truth   
  o Optionality |
Jennifer Saul, *Lying, Misleading and What is Said* (https://philpapers.org/rec/SAULMA-3), Chapters | • Arguments for minimal contents:   
  o Shared content accounts   
  o Speech act accounts   
  o Modular accounts |
2 and 3.

|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                           | • Communication as purposive  
|                                           |   - Referential purposes  
|                                           |   - emotive purposes  
|                                           | • How to fit tone into truth conditional semantics  
|                                           |   - Truth conditions  
|                                           |   - Objective counterparts and presuppositions  
|                                           |   - Uselessness |

Background Reading:

**Week 1:**

- Jeff Speaks, “Theories of Meaning” ([https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meaning/](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/meaning/), especially §2.1)
- Donald Davidson, “Reply to Foster” ([https://philpapers.org/rec/DAVRTF-2](https://philpapers.org/rec/DAVRTF-2))

**Week 2:**

- Gideon Makin, “Frege’s Distinction Between Sense and Reference” ([https://philpapers.org/rec/MAKFDB](https://philpapers.org/rec/MAKFDB))
- Quine, “Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes” ([https://philpapers.org/rec/QUIQAP](https://philpapers.org/rec/QUIQAP))
- David Kaplan. “Opacity” ([https://philpapers.org/rec/KAPQO](https://philpapers.org/rec/KAPQO))
- David Kaplan, “Quantifying in” ([https://philpapers.org/rec/KAPQI](https://philpapers.org/rec/KAPQI))

**Week 3:**

- Evans, Varieties of Reference. Chapters 4 and 11. ([https://philpapers.org/rec/EVATVO](https://philpapers.org/rec/EVATVO))
• Goodman, Rachel, “Do Acquaintance Theorists Have an Attitude Problem?” (https://philpapers.org/rec/GOODAT-4)

• Goodman, Rachel, “On the supposed connection between proper names and singular thought” (https://philpapers.org/rec/GOOOTS-2)

Week 4:

• Saul Kripke, “Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference” (https://philpapers.org/rec/KRISRA-2)

• Genoveva Martí, “Direct Reference and Definite Descriptions” (https://philpapers.org/rec/MARDRA-2)

• Keith Donnellan, “Proper names and identifying descriptions” (https://philpapers.org/rec/DONPNA)

Week 5:

• Arthur Smullyan, “Modality and Description” (https://philpapers.org/rec/SMUMAD)


• Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (https://philpapers.org/rec/KRINAN)

Week 6:


• John Perry, “Frege on Demonstratives” (https://philpapers.org/rec/PERFOD)

• John Perry, “The Problem of the Essential Indexical” (https://philpapers.org/rec/PERTPO)

• Cappelen and Dever, The Inessential Indexical (https://philpapers.org/rec/CAPTII)

• Hector-Neri Castañeda, "'He’: A Study in the Logic of Self-consciousness," (https://philpapers.org/rec/CASHOT)
Week 7:

- David Kaplan, “Dthat” (Available here: http://www.andrewmbailey.com/kap/)

Week 8:

- Jeffrey C. King, “Speaker Intention in Context” (https://philpapers.org/rec/KINSII)
- Jeff Speaks, “The Role of Speaker and Hearer in the Character of Demonstratives” (https://philpapers.org/rec/SPETRO-16)

Week 9:

- Emma Borg, “Saying what you mean: Unarticulated constituents and communication” (https://philpapers.org/rec/BORSWY)
- Kent Bach, “Conversational Implicature” (https://philpapers.org/rec/BACLCI)
- Jason Stanley, “Context and Logical Form” (https://philpapers.org/rec/STACAL)

Week 10:

- Emma Borg, “Explanatory roles for minimal content” (https://philpapers.org/rec/BORERF)

Week 11:

• Jennifer Hornsby, “Meaning and Uselessness” (https://philpapers.org/rec/HORMAU)

• Luvell Anderson & Ernie Lepore, “Slurring Words” (https://philpapers.org/rec/ANDSW)

• Timothy Williamson, “Reference, Inference, and the Semantics of Pejoratives” (https://philpapers.org/rec/WILRIA-2)

• Elizabeth Camp, “Slurring Perspectives” (https://philpapers.org/rec/CAMSP-3)