**Social Cognition (PHIL10131)**

**Spring 2019 Course Guide**

**People**

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My office hours are 2-3pm Wednesdays, in 4.05.

Course secretary: Ms Ann-Marie Cowe ([philinfo@ed.ac.uk](mailto:philinfo@ed.ac.uk))

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**Course aims and objectives**

This course examines the question of how we understand other people's behaviour. It considers different philosophical theories concerning how we attribute mental states to others, and discusses related questions such as whether this ability is unique to the human species, and whether it is innate. It will also examine the relation between social cognition and further issues such as our knowledge of our own minds. The course is strongly interdisciplinary, and will draw on sources from developmental psychology, neuroscience and anthropology, to support philosophical arguments.

**Intended learning outcomes**

On completion of this course, students will be able to demonstrate:

- Knowledge about the current philosophical debates concerning our ability to attribute mental states to others

- Understanding of some of the primary methodologies used in current cognitive science

- Knowledge of key empirical findings in the field of social cognition, and an understanding of how they can be used to critique philosophical arguments in this area

- The ability to bring analytic and critical skills to bear on texts in both philosophy and psychology

Students will also develop the following transferable skills:

- The ability to present complex ideas in a concise and clear manner in both oral and written work.

- Analytic and critical skills

- The development of research skills, such as using library and online resources

**Teaching and learning**
This course will comprise of pre-recorded lectures and a 2 hour weekly seminar (time and location TBC). Further, students will take turns to introduce one of the seminars with a short presentation. This will consist of a summary of the paper in question and several suggestions for discussion.

Syllabus
Week 1: Introduction and Folk psychology
Week 2: Theory-theory
Week 3: Simulation theory
Week 4: Mirror neurons
Week 5: Can infants mindread?
Week 6: Cross-cultural variations in theories of mind
Week 7: Altruism in non-human animals
Week 8: Confabulation
Week 9: Social cognition and knowledge of our own minds: asymmetric accounts
Week 10: Social cognition and knowledge of our own minds: symmetric accounts
Week 11: Pedagogy and revision

General background reading


- Lavelle, J.S. (2019). The Social Mind: A Philosophical Introduction. Taylor and Francis. [This is the core textbook for the class].


Week 1: Introduction and Folk Psychology
Welcome to Advanced Philosophy of Mind and Cognition! The course will focus on how we think about other minds (and how this relates to the way in which we think about our own mind). This session will introduce the topic of social cognition and examine a foundational idea that sets the scene for further debates in the field: folk psychology.

Class reading:


Secondary Reading:
Week 2: Theory-theory
Weeks 2-5 will introduce the main theories concerning how we understand other people’s behaviour. This seminar looks at how Theory-theorists answer this question. Theory-theorists maintain that we need a theory of mind in order to grasp mental state terms. We therefore need to have sufficient grasp of this theory in order to attribute mental states to others. In this class we examine the view that this theory is pre-dominantly learned, later in the course we will consider more nativist accounts.

Class Readings:

Secondary Readings (many of these are useful for further weeks as well):

Week 3: Simulation theory
In this week we look at the earliest challenger to the Theory-theory in the form of Simulation theory. Simulation theorists think that we attribute mental states to others by ‘putting
ourselves in their shoes’, using the mechanisms which generate our own emotional responses and mental states to ‘simulate’ the situation of the other person.

Class readings:

Secondary readings:

**Week 4: The direct perception of mental states and mirror neurons**
As saw in the previous week’s seminar, Simulation theorists have appealed to neuroscience in support of their claims. Mirror neurons are a group of neurons which are active both when we engage in actions and when we perceive those actions in others. But how should we interpret these data? In this seminar we will examine the role of mirror neurons in different theories of social cognition, focussing on Vittorio Gallese and Shaun Gallagher’s claim that the discharge of mirror neurons somehow enables us to ‘directly perceive’ mental states. We will also look at theories which give mirror neurons a less explanatory and more predictive role.

Class reading:

Secondary reading:


**Week 5: Can infants mindread?**

There is a lively debate in cognitive science about how best to explain the ‘gap’ between young infants (6 – 15 months) ability to pass non-verbal false belief tasks and older children’s (3-4 years) failure in verbal versions of the task. This leads Apperly and Butterfill to endorse the ‘two systems’ account of mindreading.

**Class reading:**

**Secondary reading:**


Week 6: Cross-cultural variations in theories of mind

In the late 90’s and early 2000’s, researchers in developmental psychology began to question the premise that we understand other people’s behaviour (primarily) by attributing mental states to them. Perhaps this is simply an artefact of a Western culture, where most of these experiments are carried out, with its focus on the individual. Cross-cultural studies started to take place contrasting the behaviour of participants from East Asian societies (traditionally believed to have a strong ‘collectivist’ ethic) and Western societies. Anthropologists also studied belief attribution in traditional societies. The results, as we will see, are a mixed bag. But they promise to shed light on which parts of our social cognition are innate, and which may be affected by the culture in which we grow up.

Class reading:


Secondary reading:


**Week 7: Altruism in non-human animals**

Helping others requires being able to know what they need. But how close is the relation between social cognition and altruistic behaviour? What *does* altruistic behaviour even consist in? In this seminar we will look at how philosophers have conceived of the altruism/egoism debate, including the important distinctions between *ethical egoism, psychological egoism, and evolutionary egoism*. We then turn to the question of whether the ability to attribute goals to others, and whether altruistic behaviour exists in species other than our own. We will look at the recent work of the psychologist Frans de Waal, as well as more traditional philosophical accounts of altruistic behaviour.

**Class Reading**

**Secondary Reading**


- Butler, J. (1726). *Sermon XI. Upon the love of our neighbour*. Available through Project Guttenberg.

- Sterelney, K. & Griffiths, P. *Sex and Death*. University of Chicago Press. *Ch.8*


**Week 8: Confabulation**

The course so far has mostly examined how subjects learn of other’s mental states (although simulation theory made important reference to our capacity to learn of our own). Over the next three weeks we will consider the relations between social cognition and self-knowledge.
Week 8 focuses on confabulation. Roughly, ‘confabulation’ is the phenomenon whereby subjects form false post-hoc beliefs explaining their attitudes and actions. We will examine how best to categorise confabulation, before considering how to explain it. Specifically, we will consider whether the failures in self-knowledge in such cases are profoundly social: do subjects make mistakes because they are motivated to please their interlocutors?

Class readings:


Secondary readings:


**Week 9: Social cognition and knowledge of our own minds: asymmetric accounts**
Social cognition is often held to importantly differ from subjects’ knowledge of their own minds, both in terms of the mechanism by which such ascriptions are formed and how they are justified. We might think that subjects have a special mode of access to their own minds which others lack. Indeed, this may also form the basis of our account of social cognition.

Class readings:


Secondary readings:


**Week 10: Social cognition and knowledge of our own minds: symmetric accounts**

This week considers objections to the view discussed in week 9. Here we will examine the contention that self-knowledge importantly resembles our knowledge of other people’s minds – both are acquired and justified in the same way.

Class readings:

Secondary readings:


**Week 11: Pedagogy and revision**

We will finish the course by recapping what we’ve learnt so far and by thinking about the process of learning itself. Specifically, we will consider how knowledge is communicated by individuals to others.

**Class readings:**


**Secondary readings:**


**Assessment**

This course has three components of assessment:

- Class Participation (10%)

- Mid-term essay of 1,500 words (40%). **Due Thursday 28th February 2019 by 12 pm.**

- End-of-semester essay of 2,500 words (50%). **Due Thursday 25th April 2019 by 12 pm.**