2000: BA Philosophy, University of California Santa Barbara
2009: MA Philosophy, San Jose State University
I am interested in non-traditional analyses of knowledge, specifically those that involve the notion of knowing as a purely mental state. I'm very sympathetic to the view that regards knowledge as a basic epistemological concept because it gives the philosopher the leverage needed to shift the burden of skepticism and alleviates the concern about providing jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for such a concept. This is an advantage that should be taken if we are to continue to ask the question: "What is knowing?" However, knowledge is not unanalyzable, as some in this camp think, it just resists reductionist approaches, and the discovery of its proper analysis will be the result of new, creative approaches to tradtional epistemological problems that start by shifting the dialectic in ways that are advantageous.
Something that I think is closely related to this project and one that I have been interested in for several years now is the relation of intentional content to one's environment. I am nearly completely convinced that most intentional content is externally individuated, but there remain several serious obstacles to developing a solid externalist theory of mental content. I want to investigate these issues and understand how the solutions to some specific problems with content externalism might be brought to bear upon the analysis of knowledge.
"The Problem with Propositional Seeing"
"No Anomalous Determination: A Pragmatic Theory of Content Individuation"
"The Problem of Bare Knowledge"
"Radical Externalism and Collective Mental States"
"A Causal-Epistemic View of Remembering"
Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind