Philosophy

Ethics reading group

Reading: Otsuka, Michael (2012). Prioritarianism and the Separateness of Persons. Utilitas 24 (03):365-380.

Abstract: For a prioritarian by contrast to a utilitarian, whether a certain quantity of utility falls within the boundary of one person's life or another's makes the following moral difference: the worse the life of a person who could receive a given benefit, the stronger moral reason we have to confer this benefit on this person. It would seem, therefore, that prioritarianism succeeds, where utilitarianism fails, to ‘take seriously the distinction between persons’. Yet I show that, contrary to these appearances, prioritarianism fails, in ways strikingly parallel to those in which utilitarianism fails, to take this distinction seriously. In so doing, I draw on and develop an earlier critique of prioritarianism by disentangling and pressing two distinct separateness-of-persons objections offered there. One objection is that prioritarianism is insensitive to ‘prudential justifications’. The other is that it is insensitive to the competing claims of different individuals.

PhilPapers: Prioritarianism and the Separateness of Persons

Contact

This group is organised by the ethics research group. For more information or to find out about future readings (and venues!), please contact Rick Sendelbeck or Claire Hamlett.

Ethics research group

Rick Sendelbeck

Claire Hamlett

Oct 13 2016 -

Ethics reading group

13 Oct 2016: Prioritarianism and the Separateness of Persons

Room F29/30, Psychology Building, 7 George Square, Edinburgh, EH8 9JZ