Speaker: Graham Priest (City University of New York)
Title: Counterfactuals and Theory Choice
Abstract: Elsewhere I have endorsed a model of rational choice between logical theories, in terms of computing the weighted average of the various good-making criteria of theories. There is currently a debate between those (like Williamson) who hold that counterfactuals with impossible antecedents are all vacuously true, and those (such as myself), who hold that this is not the case. In this talk I will show how the debate can be understood in terms of the above-mentioned model of rational theory-choice. I shall argue that non-vacuism is the better theory. The main point of the talk, however, is to illustrate the model of theory-choice, and so support its plausibility.
The seminars are organised by the epistemology research group. For more details or to find out about future meetings, contact Orestis Palermos.
Room 1.17, Dugald Stewart Building, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh, EH8 9AD