British Association of Islamic Studies (BRAIS)

Plenary Address – 10 April 2014

 *Rethinking Muslim Cosmopolitanism:*

 *Civilizational Moorings/Cosmopolitan Options*

**OVERVIEW**

**Muslim Cosmopolitanism between South Asia and North Africa**

Today I would like to accent the synergy of two key social forces – civilizational formation and cosmopolitan creativity. I will make two arguments and advance one thesis.

First, I argue that there is a notion of Muslim subjective longing that can, and should, be identified as cosmopolitan. More than simply remembering the past, Muslim cosmopolitan also projects traces of the past with new accents in the future.

Second, I argue that this cosmopolitan longing builds on a related activity, one that requires a collective belonging. Embedded in history, it is often heralded as Islamic or Islamicate civilization. Cosmopolitan and civilization become complimentary qualifiers. They function in tandem. Two sides of a single coin, each illumines the other.

Yet neither Islamic(ate) civilization nor Muslim cosmopolitanism is an abstract generality. Both must be dated and located, grounded and specified, articulated and defended, not once and for all but again, and again, and again, from the 7th to the 21st century, from North Africa to Central, South and Southeast Asia, from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean to the Phil-Indo Archipelago.

How do we locate the *Muslim* nature of cosmopolitan longing? To be Muslim in society is no different than any other social identity; it is the same as being Jewish or Christian, Buddhist or Hindu, secular or atheist in society. Whatever you believe, you have to believe from *somewhere*, and in the Muslim case, you have to be Muslim from *somewhere.*

While both qualifiers - the universal arc of religion and the local mark of geography - are consequential, to be Muslim and also cosmopolitan, that is, to be a *Muslim* cosmopolitan, requires a further qualifier.

And this brings me to my thesis: To be Muslim and cosmopolitan, you have to be Muslim from *somewhere in between.* Specifically, you have to be from some place marked by fluid boundaries, multiple ways of being and seeing, living and feeling the world. While not all aspects of Islamic(ate) civilization are cosmopolitan, all Muslim cosmopolitans come from specific sites within Islamic(ate) civilization. They are nodes in the inhabited world, places with fungible markers mirroring, but also modifying, a religion with fixed boundaries.

Why is in-between-ness so important? Because not only are Muslim cosmopolitans from interstitial places, places accented by their in-between-ness, but also, and most importantly, they are on the peripheries of empire. Not one but several empires marked the expanding scope of Muslim rule – from the 7th to the 17th centuries. They crisscrossed Africa and Asia, and it is two of those places – North Africa and South Asia – that I want to visit today, in order to showcase the genesis and persistence of Muslim cosmopolitanism. Though there are other regions and epochs to consider, I argue that the nature of Muslim cosmopolitan identity cannot be understood without these interstitial places and the remarkable individuals they produced.

Slide # 2 – 11th century Hindustan

First. South Asia, aka Hind or Hindustan. My pivotal argument is that South Asia – the large arc of the Indian subcontinent, from Afghanistan to Bengal, from the Himalayas to the Indian Ocean – is the crucial cradle, the birthplace and nurturer, of all that can be, and later becomes, Muslim cosmopolitanism.

Slide # 3 – 12th century Maghrib

And second to it is the Maghrib, where interaction with Northern as well as Southern Mediterranean cultures was as intense as the admixture of Central Asian/South Asian, Turk and Indic cultures, in the subcontinent. Today’s map, separating northern from southern Mediterranean nations, belies the long history that saw a Muslim presence as integral to both Mediterranean islands and southern Spain. The resulting admixture is at once civilizational and cosmopolitan. It is in these two peripheries of Islamic empire building, I argue, that we find the most notable exemplars of both civilizational formation and cosmopolitan identity. The former is a contextual, structural belonging, while the latter is a textual, subjective longing. Both intertwine, at once forming, and reforming, what is meant by Islamic civilization and Muslim cosmopolitanism. There has been a lot of scholarship on Islamic(ate) civilization, relatively little on Muslim cosmopolitanism. My goal today is to conjoin them.

Put in its starkest form, I am arguing that civilization and cosmopolitanism combine spatial, historical belongings with spiritual, contemporary longings. The former are horizontal: they connect across huge distances that demarcate cultural zones. The latter are vertical; they connect across temporal divides that link this world and the next, but also prior generations with current family members. Both – territorial belonging and spiritual longing - combine in someone deemed to be Muslim cosmopolitan.

My argument is novel: you won’t find this logic or its iteration anywhere on Google or Wikipedia. Because it is novel, I want to make it in nuce, using summary examples. They are four. First, are four exemplars, two from South Asia aka Hind/Hindustan and two others from North Africa aka the Maghrib. Second, are four scholars, two focusing on Istanbul, two others on Cairo, with a side glance at Alexandria. Together these eight voices tell a double story, the formation of a new civilization, Islamic(ate) from the 7th to the 17st century, and then the emergence of a new form of cosmopolitanism, Muslim cosmopolitanism, from the 11th to the 21st century. In the interest of time, I will give more space, and attention, to the four exemplars, and provide only an addendum to describe the four scholars.

Slide # 4 – Al-Jabiri

The contemporary Moroccan philosopher Muhammad ‘Abid al-Jabiri (d. 2010)has specified three forms of knowledge in Islamic scholarship – ***bayan****,* ***‘irfan***and***burhan****.[[1]](#footnote-1)*The first privileges literacy and textual knowledge, the second introspection and mystical insight, while the third extols experimental testing, and the need for empirical observation.

Though all three can be found in other civilizations and other epochs of world history, it is their interactive synergy that has made Islamic(ate) civilization distinctive, Muslim cosmopolitanism possible.

The background question which all of you may be asking is one that I have often asked, or should I say: it has often been asked of me whenever I address the topic of Islam, and link it to civilization or cosmopolitanism. Must not Islamic civilization always be mimetic? And must not Muslim cosmopolitanism always nostalgic? The common assumption is that Western civilization, going back to Greek/Roman antecedents, is the model for all civilizations; China, India and Islam are all copy cats of its strongest features even while providing their own regional accents. The parallel critique is made of Muslim cosmopolitanism. To be cosmopolitan is to be European or American, if not by birth at least in taste, travel, lifestyle preference. For Eurocentric and American triumphalists, it is the modern West that has created what is known as cosmopolitan thought, its ideal and practice, its vision as also its limits. All other brands are either branches or copies of the original.

**Two Early Exemplars of Muslim Cosmopolitanism:**

**One South Asian, One North African**

In the examples that follow I may not dispel the myth of Western superiority but let me try to complicate it.

**I – Al-Biruni**

Slides # 5 & 6- Biruni in Tehran Park, on Moroccan Stamp

 Indisputably Abu Rayhan Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Biruni (d. 1048)

 was one of the great polymaths of the premodern Muslim world. A scholar trained in multiple disciplines, Biruni benefited from royal patronage to pursue his research and writing. He was a contemporary of the well known Ibn Sina or Avicenna, with whom he corresponded about the nature and goals of scientific research. But unlike Avicenna, Biruni synthesized a wide swath of disciplines with an accent on observation and experimentation in all that he undertook to study, describe and publish. He is said to have written nearly 150 books. They range from astrology and astronomy to biology, geology, paleontology, optics, cartography, geodesy, mineralogy, psychology, linguistics and mathematics. He further engaged history, religion and philosophy, with remarkable command of languages.

In other words, both culturally and linguistically Biruni was an exemplar of inbetweenness. He was an interstitial Muslim subject. Though his first language was a Central Asian precursor of Uzbek, he also wrote in both Persian and Arabic, and translated from Greek, Sanskrit and Syriac into Arabic. And so through his scientific production, Biruni secured for himself a prominent place in the pantheon of those who produced Islamic(ate) civilization as distinctive within, but also contributing, to the oecumene, the advancement of the civilized world as it was known from the 11th century on.

It is in his contribution to ‘the discovery of India’, however, that Biruni becomes an exemplar of Muslim cosmopolitanism. Other Muslims had preceded him to India. Since the late 7th century there had been a thriving community of settlers, traders, and soldiers in Sind,[[2]](#footnote-2) for instance, but no one before Biruni was intent to understand the cultural depth, as also the scientific advances, of Hindustan.

It can even be argued that Biruni was the pioneer of comparative studies in religion. His approach to the study of religious traditions presupposes, first of all, a genuine willingness to see truth and value in other cultures, without being forced to insist that there are universal truths in all religious traditions or, like a radical pluralist, that all cultures are equally valid in their religious and social expressions. Rather, what Biruni seems to be arguing is that there is a common human element in every culture that makes all cultures distant relatives, however foreign they might seem one to another.  This is the main premise underlying his whole project. Neither a textual inference nor a mystical insight, it is one based on observation and empirical data collection (***burhan***). This theme is discernible in the passages on *India* where Biruni compares and contrasts the views and customs of different cultures.

In order to demonstrate that there is a common human element that makes all cultures distant relatives, and India central to their connection over time, Biruni starts with a critique of the available Muslim literature on Hindu culture. According to Biruni, not only was the available literature on Hinduism insufficient, it was also misleading. "Everything which exists on this subject in our literature,” he complains, “is second hand information which one copied from the other, a farrago of materials never sifted by the sieve of critical examination."[[3]](#footnote-3) This, according to Biruni, was inconsistent with the ethical framework provided by the Scriptures of both Christianity and Islam. He illustrates his argument by referring to the Qur’an and the Bible respectively. The Qur’an reads, "Speak the truth, even if it were against yourselves." (Qur’an: 4, 134); in a similar vein it is stated in the Bible that "Do not mind the fury of kings in speaking the truth before them. They only possess your body, but they have no power over your soul" (*Cf*. Matt.x.18, 19, 28; Luke xii. 4).[[4]](#footnote-4) In short, it was religious and ethical concerns, more than anything else that led Biruni to study other cultures from a comparative perspective.

And what makes him notable as a cosmopolitan Muslim, is his self-conscious advance of a method for comparative inquiry and analysis. Biruni was not just a research scientist but also a self-conscious and self-critical comparativist.

Slide # 7 – Al-Biruni’s India

 For Biruni, comparison provided a distinctive heuristic purpose: to eradicate common misconceptions, in this case, misconceptions about Hinduism among Muslims, and in its place to promote a better acquaintanceship between two religious traditions, Islam and Hinduism.

Yet Biruni was not proposing a sort of perennial philosophical view that presupposes the transcendental unity of all religions. Rather, as a believing Muslim, he simply welcomed certain differences among different peoples. In other words, he believed, as he himself stated, that "God has created the world as containing many differences in itself,"[[5]](#footnote-5) and these differences should be welcomed. In order to prove his argument, he attempted to explore some of the most disputed issues, such as God, polytheism, creation, and hierarchy or the caste system in different cultures.

What justifies Biruni’s stature as a pioneer Muslim cosmopolitan is his theological inbetweenness. Biruni treats the concept of God as a shared resource for all cultures. Even when he critiques idol worshipping in the Indian context, he limits that critique to the reflexes and practices of the uneducated class. At the same that he finds them abominable, he does not claim that they are unique to the Indian religion. What Biruni emphasizes, however, is that similar practices can be observed in even higher cultures where the division between educated and uneducated class is also evident.

Above all, Biruni could not and did not tolerate those who rejected something – whether an idea or an experiment – out of hand before seeing whether it could be useful. His intolerance of the fool or bigot is illustrated in the following anecdote. "Once, when he showed an instrument for setting the times of prayer to a certain jurist, the latter objected that it had engraved upon it the names of the Byzantine months; this constituted an imitation of the infidels. ‘The Byzantines also eat food’. retorted Biruni, ‘so do not imitate them in this’. After that he refrained from further discussion with this man.[[6]](#footnote-6)

In his study of other religions, as in his approach to the galaxy of planets, Biruni argues that understanding is not only possible but also necessary. In religion, as in science, one must begin with a phenomenological approach, looking at things as they are (***burhan*).** Then, and only then, can one also dialogue with others and pursue comparative analysis in order to see the wonders of creation, whether in the circuit of the sky or the ambit of society.

**II – IBN KHALDUN**

Slides # 8 & 9 – Ibn Khaldun in Tunis Park & on Postage Stamp

The second exemplar of Islamicate civilization, who also signals a new direction for Muslim cosmopolitanism, was the Maghribi juridical philosopher turned historian, Abdur Rahman Ibn Khaldun (d.1406). Ibn Khaldun came from a family that had migrated from Andalusia to the Maghrib. He accepted the patronage system as readily as did his precursor Biruni. But unlike Biruni, Ibn Khaldun strove to use his political wisdom to benefit one of the actual rulers of his day. Moving from one court to another, he became disillusioned and retired to Mamluk Cairo as a judge. His life, like al-Biruni’s, demonstrated the importance and the constraints of royal patronage as a stimulant to intellectual creativity, while in ***The*** ***Muqaddimah*** (an introduction to his multivolume world history) he used his double training in philosophy and law to discern patterns in history. His outlook, like Biruni’s, was pragmatic, governed by the laws of ***burhan***: how to refine and theorize what you observe in actual human exchange. Whereas Muslim historians conventionally subscribed to the view that God passed sovereignty and hegemony (***dawlah***) from one dynasty to another through His divine wisdom, Ibn Khaldun explained how it appeared in terms of a cycle of natural stages that followed an almost inevitable pattern. He ascribed the success of tribally organized migratory peoples to their stronger sense of consensus or group solidarity. It allowed them to acquire military superiority over settled peoples but their superiority, in turn, was diminished once the founding figures or early generations ceased to control the fissiparous instincts of their kinship group. As the family disperses itself among sedentary peoples and ceases to live the hard life of migration, it becomes soft from the prosperity it has brought and begins to degenerate. Internal rivalries, often fueled by personal jealousies, force one member of the family to become a king who must rely on mercenary troops and undermine his own prosperity by paying for them. In the end, the ruling dynasty falls prey to a new tribal group with fresh group feeling. The problem was circular: civilization could not survive without military prowess, yet military prowess in itself was unstable.

 While there are others who contributed to both Islamicate civilization and Muslim cosmopolitanism, Ibn Khaldun stands out for his interstitial logic, his rigorous pursuit of in-between-ness. To offer a thumbnail definition, civilization equals culture writ large over space and time. Space predominates. The geographical lens of pre-modern civilization focuses on the Afro-Eurasian ***oikumene*** (Hodgson). Civilization presupposes cities, commerce, travel and trade, warfare and alliances, and so by its very nature civilization in general but Islamic(ate) civilization in particular should be cosmopolitan. And it is Ibn Khaldun who makes the strongest case for the durably cosmopolitan nature of Islamic(ate) civilization.

 Crucially Ibn Khaldun was a product of the 14th century Mediterranean world. What distinguished him was neither his Arab lineage nor his linkage to Berbers via marriage but his Mediterranean location. At the intersection of Jewish, Christian and Muslim influences, heir to Greek science and Arabic poetry, connected by trade and history to Asia, the Mediterranean Sea had become the nexus of Muslim cosmopolitanism by the 14th century. Social mobility as well as physical travel animated Mediterranean Muslims, especially those, like Ibn Khaldun, who rose to high posts in government, law and education. But this background only identifies the opportunities that Ibn Khaldun either inherited or developed due to his socio-economic background and the political circumstances of his era. The extra element, the defining difference, in his cosmopolitan outlook was his quest to find the points of convergence between seemingly distinct, and often competitive, disciplines of elite urban Muslims in Al-Andalus, the Maghrib, and Egypt.

 Indeed, the biggest difference between Ibn Khaldun and other elites of his generation was his orientation to ***adab***.[[7]](#footnote-7) Though trained as a ***faqih*** or jurist and familiar with all the ancillary sciences of ***fiqh*** (jurisprudence), Ibn Khaldun was also an ***adib*** or litterateur. A litterateuris attentive to words, to their expression in both speech and writing but especially, to their polyvalence. Words can mean many things in different times, places and contexts. Though this may seem a truism today, it was far from accepted knowledge or the dominant outlook, even among the notables whom Ibn Khaldun knew and whom he engaged in discussion or debate.

Slide # 10 – The Muqaddimah Abridged

 And so Ibn Khaldun is first marked as a Muslim cosmopolitan by his use of the same words with different connotations, in different contexts, for different audiences in his classic work, ***The Muqaddimah***. He is not ambiguous but ambivalent in his use of key terms such as ***badawah***, ***‘umran*** and ‘***asabiyah***. He also coins new terms such as ***‘asabiyah*** or ***‘umran*** or ***badawah*** with a specific range of meanings, one of which may be to amplify the notion of a known word, as ***‘asabiyah*** deftly does with the juridical concept of consensus.

Reliance on metaphor allows Ibn Khaldun to demonstrate how the same word, like the same event or person, can be viewed differently over time, and also from different places in the same time frame. Perhaps the most crucial argument that Ibn Khaldun makes on behalf of history as an Islamic science is that historians alone among Muslim scientists can explain how Islam arose out of a context of orality and nomadism/primitivism ***(badawah***) to become a proponent of both writing and civilization ***(hadarah).*** What had been speech and a habit became writing and a craft.[[8]](#footnote-8) Yet the very lifeline of Islam depended on maintaining the connection between literacy and orality, between writing and speech, as also between civilized and nomad. In short, analogy, while it had its most immediate application in law, could, and should, also be applied to the understanding of the laws of history, above all, the history of Islamicate civilization.

 And the nature of *networked* knowledge is also a second, decisive difference between Ibn Khaldun and other cosmopolitan elites of his day. In all aspects of his labor, Ibn Khaldun accepted, and often applauded, the achievements of his predecessors, the vast *network* of a knowledge class (the ‘***ulama)*** who undergirded Muslim society, but at the same time he introduced a difference.

 In order to establish his new science, Ibn Khaldun the jurist had to both affirm his own practice of Tradition criticism (based on ***bayan***)[[9]](#footnote-9) while allowing for an empirical approach human social organization (based on ***burhan***), the cornerstone, in his view, of a global civilization that encompassed the known world (***al-ma‘mura min al-‘ard***).[[10]](#footnote-10) In effect, he used his talent as an ***adib*** to further his project as a ***faqih***, invoking the law while opening it up to a new arena of thought. It was his forensic skill as a litterateur that allowed him to cite Event (***khabar***), itself an ancillary part of Tradition (***hadith***) scholarship, as an independent term conveying the surplus of meaning that he wanted to impart to the study of human social organization or the history of world civilization. Demarcating Tradition from Event***,*** while affirming both, became the pathway to his new science.

 Many have described Ibn Khaldun’s new science as critical history, comparative sociology or even supply side economics.[[11]](#footnote-11) I think that another descriptor is necessary. It is not only fitting but also overdue to acknowledge Ibn Khaldun as a Muslim cosmopolitan. The proof? The proof is what we have just described: his subtle, consistent use of language to further empirical observation as the cornerstone for networked knowledge.

**The Interlude of Euro-American Ascent**

From the 11th century Ghaznavid courts of Biruni to the 14th century Hafsid courts of Ibn Khaldun is a leap of time and space but all within the continuum of a Muslim imperium that had its benefits as well as constraints. The notion of parity that had existed in the premodern oecumene changed with the advent of European exploration, expansion, overseas conquest, and then colonization of vast parts of Asia and Africa. The impact on Islam and Islamic civilization from the 16th to the 21st century resulted in a deficit for Muslim cosmopolitanism. Bereft of either parity or competitive rivalry with European counterparts, almost all Islamic reformers, despite their universalist rhetoric, almost all the Islamic reformers were shaped by the influences of the colonial period. Especially keen is the emphasis on science, technology in education, constitution and parliamentary democracy in politics, and the revised role of women in social life. If Muslim nationalism became mimetic, it is due to the fact that movements that claimed a loyalty to Islam were also mimetic, picking up elements of the West that they hoped could be transformed into an Islamic system. But the Islamic system was an effortto accommodate to an emergent, if asymmetric, world system. ***There is no independent Muslim movement after the colonial period;*** all are reacting to some force, or series of forces, that emanate from the Western world, which is to say Northern Europe and USA.

 Slides # 11, 12, & 13 – 1920’s British Empire, Europe in the Middle East and Southeast Asia

 Muslim reformers recognized the power of the institutions that were propelling European maritime nations to a unique position of global prestige. The reformers came from those countries whose Muslim elites were most engaged by the spectre of European commercial and military penetration - Egypt and India, Iran and Turkey before World War I, but then following the war, also Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco. The North African reformers coalesced into a movement known as Salafiya, or Islamic traditionalism. Criticized for their unwitting promotion of historical retardation, its leaders seemed to hark back to a golden age that never existed, or at least could never be reconstructed, and so their passionate pleas merely drained energies away from the task at hand, to accommodate to the new reality of a European world order. Yet most of the reformers did act in good faith, as committed Muslims conflicted by the gap between Europe's pragmatic success and what seemed to be its spiritual vapidity. It was as though they were witnesses to a novel and 'unholy' revelation. For them, in the words of Yousef Choueiri, "the arbiter of truth and knowledge suddenly ceased to be enclosed in the revealed word of God. Another text, with no specific author or format, had made a permanent intrusion. It was the West in its political systems, military presence and economic domination which now appeared in the background as an authoritative code of practice."[[12]](#footnote-12)

 But the authoritative code was not uniform. The intervening European powers quarreled with one another. Some Muslim polities, such as the Sharifian Kingdom of Morocco, benefited from these quarrels, able to resist direct rule because no Mediterranean power wanted its rivals to control the seat of the Arab/Muslim West. But all polities were affected by the great wars, sometimes known as the Christian wars, which were waged by these self-same powers twice in the twentieth century. It was only due to the enormous expenditures and consequent destruction of these wars that protest movements among Muslims and others were able to mobilize into national liberation movements. Gradually, as the smoke cleared from the second of these horrific Christian wars, most Muslim ruling elites were able to grasp the laurel of independence. Even so, not all were marked by the same political order.

 Even countries that were not colonized directly, like Saudi Arabia and Iran, still experienced the effects of colonial economic penetration into the eastern Mediterranean and Indian Ocean, and the structures that arose after Independence reflect this influence, above all in the sphere of politics and law. It was because the nature of self-rule was shaped as much by European as by indigenous models that one must speak of 'mimetic nationalism'. Though Arab, as by non-Arab, Muslim leaders embraced nationalism to chart the path to independence, the models of governance were derived from the departing colonials. Whether one looks to constitutional charters or to the adoption of separate executive and legislative bodies, the impress of European precedents is evident. At the same time the boundaries of new nations reflected a patchwork of compromise that was worked out by the European powers not by their Muslim subjects. Saddam Hussein's outburst in Fall 1990 over the manipulation of Iraq's borders with Kuwait was at once justified and spurious. It was justified because the borders of **all** African and Asian countries were set in the colonial period or its immediate aftermath. It was spurious because many countries benefited as well as lost from such manipulation: without the addition of parts of Kurdistan, especially the oil-rich region around Mosul, Iraq, for instance, would not have had the geopolitical resources that make it potentially the economic giant among all Arab states.

 The truth about the process by which post-colonial borders were decided may be simpler, though no prettier, than conspiracy theories allow: disparate communities of Asia and Africa had been welded together as parts of the British or French or Dutch empires. They could not be dissolved and reconstituted in their pre-colonial form with independence. Often the very conditions of self-rule had to be set by colonial authorities and imperial administration because consent could not have been secured on any other basis. Yet the end result was to make the entire process of Arab/Muslim nationalism seem imitative or mimetic. It appealed only to a limited stratum of elites. The mechanisms to curb military control and to spur the emergence of a middle class were never set in place. Structural violence took on a new face, but it was still violent and its tensions, contradictions and excesses continue till the present day, making it more difficult to reconstruct what is the legacy of Islamic(ate) civilization and the options for Muslim cosmopolitanism.

 Throughout the Muslim world the state functions as an obedience context, and the rulers of the Muslim state demand total compliance with the state’s vision of Islam. Tacitly it recognizes that the norms it imposes, are not universally shared by all Muslims, yet publicly it arrogates to itself and to its custodians the right to decide which elements of Islamic belief and practice are to be supported. The memory of other Islams is too strong, however, to be erased. In each instance Muslims have to decide how to preserve their symbolic identity within a public order that is anti-religious at worst, as in Russia and China, (but formerly also in Indonesia and Turkey), or pseudo-religious at best, as in most Arab states, Iran, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

 While the legacy of colonialism reshaped the Muslim world into truncated territories and contested borders, capitalism left it with economies that could only function on the margins, benefiting the major powers of the High Tech era. These powers were the technologically advanced, professionally differentiated, and economically privileged societies of Western Europe, North America and now East Asia. Even before the rubric of First, Second, and Third Worlds was invented in the 1950s, there existed a Third World. It embraced **all** Muslim societies, even those benefiting from the petrodollar infusion that began in the 50s and 60s but did not accelerate till the 70s and 80s.

**Modern Exemplars of Muslim Cosmopolitan Thinking**

 Two figures stand forth on the other side of the divide between imperial parity and Euro-American superiority. One from the Maghrib is Malek Bennabi. The other from India is Maqbool Fida Husain, aka M.F. Husain.

**I - Malek Bennabi**

**Slides # 14, 15 Bennabi in b& w, and on postage stamp**

While civilizational and cosmopolitan do overlap, they still have different emphases. In the aftermath of what Hodgson calls the Great Western Transmutation, no Muslim scholar can, or does, compete on even terms with Euro-American rivals. A major instance would be a modern North African whose life contrasts with Ibn Khaldun. Just as the latter was a forerunner of civilization belongings and cosmopolitan longings in a Muslim key, so Malek Bennabi may be considered a precursor of Islam in the new millennium.

 Malek Bennabi (1905-1973), trained as an electrical engineer in Paris, now enjoys a rebirth in Algeria as both an Islamic loyalist and a radical modernist. Following his studies in Paris, Bennabi could not return to Algeria immediately after the 1962 revolution because of his pro-Islamic stance. He lived in Egypt for a time before returning to Algiers, where he then held weekly salons, or open meetings, in both Arabic and French until his death in 1973.

Bennabi’s stance serves as a counterpoint to political Islam, with its focus on the public domain of government and governance, alliances and rivalries, interests and strategies. But at the same time, Bennabi does not advocate the slippery project known as Islamization of knowledge. Instead of making modernity Islamic, he advocates revisiting, and reinvigorating, the roots of Islamic civilization. Bennabi focuses on the religious principle at the heart of every civilizational endeavor, but especially Islam. It is not enough to be Muslim. ***One must be a reasoning, rational subject*,** in short, a thinking individual.

 Bennabi advocates precisely the kind of moral rather than instrumental reasoning that Arendt had prized consistently from her earliest writings. Again, what stands forth is the combination of ***bayan, ‘irfan*** and ***burhan***, but here with an accent on ***burhan*** as emotive and aesthetic, not just experimental and didactic. To the extent that one relies on moral principles, in Bennabi’s view, it is only through a ceaselessly probing endeavor to connect with first principles. It is the moral Muslim subject who embodies the distinctive aesthetic sensibility that has everywhere marked the greatness of Islamic civilization. It is neither bureaucracies nor business ventures that evoke the hope of the future for Islamic creativity. True creativity requires instead “deep knowledge of the structures of professions, of the workings of productive organizations, attention to detail and method, diligence and perseverance in application”. Such dedication to the creative spirit is not incidental or additive; it is foundational and necessary. It must precede “the successful transplantation of modern economies into the post-colonial Muslim world.” [[13]](#footnote-13) Education at all levels is the key to this still abstract yet morally profound agenda.

In effect, Bennabi tries to be explicitly interstitial, to walk the tightrope between authenticity and modernity in two contexts. He acknowledges the superiority of European/Western culture in the public sphere but at the same time projects the resilience of Islamic norms, and the opportunity for Islamic values, to supplement, not replace, the instruments of a high tech, post-industrial and post-colonial world. If others are interstitial by inference, he is explicit in his embrace of seeming opposites. He refuses to be bound by place. It is neither location in the Maghrib nor in Europe that determines one’s outlook but *bi-location* - the experience of two worlds, the imperial world of Europe and the colonial world of North Africa, and the awareness of both - that defines one’s primary identity, orientation, and world-view. “Post-colonialism in Algeria,” notes the semiotician, Walter Mignolo, “is not the same as post-colonialism in France…Bennabi’s reflections before, during, and after the eight years of the Algerian war (1954-1962) transcended the events and brought the discussion back home to Algeria, rather than letting it remain in Paris, counting in France’s history.”[[14]](#footnote-14)

While Bennabi’s views could be compared to those of Camus or Sartre, in fact, they were more similar to Fanon’s albeit in a religious not a racial trajectory. Both Fanon and Bennabi experienced Europe, especially its higher education in the humanities and sciences, but remained grounded in Africa. “The meaning of the Algerian war in France,” comments Mignolo, “was embedded in the history of France and European imperialism, while the meaning of the Algerian war in Algeria was imbedded in the history of North Africa and the enduring histories of colonialism.” [[15]](#footnote-15)

Bennabi was a conceptual idealist constrained by psychological realism: Algeria after independence remained a colonized country; it could not be truly free until it faced the burden of its colonial past, which included the susceptibility to be colonized. For that lingering susceptibility, Bennabi coined a new term, ***colonisabilite***, the disposition to be colonized or to remain bound by colonial ways of thinking. In order to reverse the uncritical acceptance of norms, values and concepts from the dominant French (or British or American) power, one had to revisit the colonization of knowledge. In short, one had to reconstruct a new edifice of civilization.

 And for Bennabi the clarion cry for an intellectual struggle was ***jihad fikri.*** ***Jihad fikri*** required inaugurating fresh thinking and new beginnings. Though it has gone unanswered in post-1991 Algeria, it insists on thought, and the need to think beyond a post- colonial epistemic framework within the Muslim world. His is a visionary project rather than a pragmatic program. Its next stage is still unclear, but to the extent that its visionary impulse is cosmopolitan as well as post-colonial, it anticipates the work of our final exemplar, M.F. Husain.

**II – M. F. Husain**

At first glance, it may seem strange to compare al-Biruni, Ibn Khaldun and also Malek Bennabi with a 21st century South Asian exemplar of Muslim cosmopolitanism. But again the accent is on in-betweenness, occupying a space that others have not seen, or if seen, not understood, or if understood, understood too narrowly. M. F. Husain (d. 2011) was a 20th/21st century artist who travelled even more than al-Biruni. Born near Bombay in 1915, M. F. Husain lived in many parts of India, Europe, and the United States and traveled extensively in South America and Southeast Asia. He migrated first from the Indian countryside to Bombay (now Mumbai), where he made a modest living painting street canvasses. He wore no shoes then. Actually, he never did wear shoes, though in recent years he had begun to color his toenails, and his fingernails as well. Husain’s bare feet, in the words of a defender, “always symbolized his connection to the people of India and kept him grounded in its ethos even as he rose from very humble origins to hobnob with the rich and powerful.” By the time he died in a London hospital on June 8, 2011, he had produced over 30,000 works of art during his long, itinerant life. [One of his paintings, ***Empty Bowl at the Last Supper***, sold at a London auction for $2 million in 2005.]

Three Slides of M.F. Husain’s paintings – #16,17,18

Yet M.F. Husain lived in a different epoch than al-Biruni, not Muslims but Hindus controlled the power of the media and altered political discourse in India, especially afte the end of the so-called Cold War. In the mid-1990s, he came to be defined as a Muslim enemy by right-wing Hindu politicians—and, in 2006, after failing to soothe his critics or find space to paint in his vast homeland, he moved first to Dubai, and then to Doha, on the invitation of Sheikha Mozah, a member of the Qatari royal family who also became his patron. His nonagenarian years assumed an annual pattern of movement. Every spring he traveled to London, where he had a studio, then to Rome, where he had another studio, for part of the summer, then to the United States, where he had no studio but did have an ongoing project. He divided the autumn months between Dubai and Doha. But he continued to paint Indian subjects.

Slide # 19 -M.F. Husain at his 95th birthday party

He was Muslim but more than Muslim. He was Indian but of remote Arab lineage: his ancestors had emigrated from Yemen to Gujarat centuries before. Born Muslim, he did not migrate to Pakistan after Partition in 1947. He identified with his country of birth in its evolution from a British colony to the world’s largest democracy. Husain embodied the fluid-boundary logic, the in-betweenness of Muslim cosmopolitanism in a new era. It developed as the globe began to shrink, through new communications technology, and also to expand, through opportunities to connect multiple sites. M.F. Husain combined many, apparently immiscible elements that he also modified so that all could be embraced in a seamless flow: “Nothing in creation is useless,” he once observed. “It is our duty to see how best to use it.”

 Nowhere was Husain more representative of this postcolonial cosmopolitan viewpoint than in his constant struggle to relate religion to nation, and nation and to civilization. Beginning in the 1990s, he was held increasingly accountable to judgments about whether he should be considered religious or secular. Some said he was a “last-gasp secularist” — one whose secularism privileged faith and religious practice yet emphasized syncretism. It might seem that he affirmed as much in a 2009 interview, in which he observed: “My disposition now is not dogmatic at all. I am not a fundamentalist. There are different faiths. The personal faith is within you, but you have to respect everyone’s faith. You’re not a preacher, or reformer, or a teacher, or a thinker. As a painter you just work with the visual, which becomes universal. Islam is universal.”[[16]](#footnote-16)

**Summary**

If Islam is universal, how can its traces – at once civilizational and cosmopolitan – exceed creed and nation in the 21st century? Malek Bennabi accented the need for ***jihad fikri****.* And since nothing identifies the New Age as much as branding and sloganeering, perhaps it is time to stand the concept of jihad on its head. Instead of standing for confrontational politics, or terrorist attacks against near abroad and far distant enemies, it can become a new aspect of ***adab,*** the performative code of ethical engagement with the highest ideals of Islam. The practical outcome of ***jihad fikri*** is to appeal to a new generation of Muslims, but also to evoke a new program: not Islamism or secularism but cosmopolitanism from below, the ability to move in several worlds, confirming dignity but also allowing for difference. No one should underestimate the need for all Muslims, but especially the younger generation, who are the most numerous, to do more than seek employment or education or residence abroad. To remain in their countries of birth, Millennial Muslims, those born to the Internet, Facebook and Twitter, must find dignity from the wellsprings of culture. Along with opportunities generated by effective economic reform, there must also be a radical effort to engage cosmopolitanism as a Muslim project, and that must begin with minorities.

It is for this reason that in the final section of today’s brief overview of Muslim cosmopolitanism, I look at two cities, Istanbul and Cairo, and two essays, one by a cultural geographer, Amy Mills, on a neighborhood in Istanbul, the other by a comparative sociologist, Asef Bayat, on everyday cosmopolitanism in a district of modernday Cairo. Each also has its rejoinder, to Mills the historian Ariel Salzman, and to Bayat another historian, Will Hanley.

**Brief Notes on Muslim Cosmopolitanism as a Contemporary Identity**

**I – Amy Mills on Istanbul**

How does a cultural geographer understand Muslim cosmopolitanism? Amy Mills looks at Istanbul through a broad, post-colonial optic. She recognizes the fiction of dividing history in general and Middle East history in particular into regions/polities/states that experienced or did not experience colonial rule. Even though Istanbul was never colonized, its inhabitants were shaped by European expansion, not least the remapping of Afro-Asian territories from the 18th century on. All indigenous minorities came to be defined as potential compradors, agents of outside forces. Their historical past was reshaped by their symbolic link to European others. After the founding of the Turkish republic in 1923, Jews and Christians “were seen both as betrayers of the Turkish nation-state and as uncomfortable reminders of the Ottoman imperial past”. Instead of a cosmopolitan embrace, these minorities experienced a nationalist rebuff. “Although Christian and Jewish minorities were granted formal legal equality in Turkey, in practice they have experienced discrimination and thousands have been forced, or chosen, to leave Turkey” during the past century.[[17]](#footnote-17)

The result in Istanbul alone is dramatic. At the turn of the 20th century, non-Muslim minorities and foreigners constituted 56% of the population of the city, but “by the end of the 20th century, after massive minority emigration and the rural-urban migration of Kurds and Turks to Istanbul, Christians and Jews constituted less than 1 percent of the population of a city of more than 10 million people.”[[18]](#footnote-18) (Today, in 2014, the population has increased to 14 million, with the percentage of minorities well below 1 percent.)

# 20 – Synagogue in Kuzguncuk

Mills traces the impact of this transformation from pluralist minority representation to ultra-nationalist Turkish citizenry, with special reference to Kuzguncuk, a neighborhood on the Asian side in Üsküdar district, which had a large multicultural spectrum of inhabitants, including Jews, Greeks and Armenians in its own recent past. Mills interviewed hundreds of people in order to provide what she calls a cultural landscape, or narratives of memory embedded in landscapes.[[19]](#footnote-19)

What she found is a pervasive nostalgia for the lost, cosmopolitan past of Istanbul in general and Kuzguncuk in particular. While cosmopolitanism always involves a subjective longing, for Mills it was projected through longing for the past, the deep nostalgic reflex for an Ottoman presence that was mirrored in a Turkish absence. “By the early 1990’s,” she observes, “there had emerged a larger cultural movement to remember the city’s historical cosmopolitanism.” What resulted is an irony: “Istanbul’s past minorities are represented by the landscape, while current minorities are absent from the scene.”[[20]](#footnote-20) And minorities themselves, either those who remain or those who return to visit sites from their own familial past, comply with the dominant narrative, to wit, that ethnic Turkish nationalism defines not only the nation but also its cities, including Istanbul, its districts and its neighborhoods. While Kuzguncuk, the neighborhood Mills studied, may appear to be different, its inhabitants’ nostalgia for the past merely privatizes and localizes a state narrative, where actual violence is suppressed, and tolerance is invoked as the prevalent reflex.

And so, cosmopolitanism in early 21st century Istanbul becomes the equivalent of a polite historical fig leaf: it reveals what it pretends to conceal. “In Istanbul,” concludes Mills, “cosmopolitanism is imagined locally in ways that perpetuate the notions of social difference and inequality that cosmopolitanism, as an ideal, claims to transcend.”[[21]](#footnote-21)

**II -- Salzman’s Rejoinder to Mills**

And so one might deduce that cosmopolitanism has failed in Istanbul as we approach the first centenary of the Turkish Republic (1923-2023). This is an outcome that is qualified, however, from an historian’s perspective. The historian is Ottomanist Ariel Salzmann. In her essay titled, “Islampolis, Cosmpolis: Ottoman Urbanity between Myth, Memory and Postmodernity”, Salzmann examines the case of an Armenian newspaper editor who had been murdered in Istanbul in early 2007. Through the response to that murder, Salzmann sutures together all the ambiguities of 21st century Stambouli claims to cosmopolitan identity. Those who marched in huge numbers – in what she then claimed (in early 2010) was “the largest protest against racism and religious discrimination in the history of the Middle East”[[22]](#footnote-22)–attest to a cosmopolitan impulse, but at the same time public silence over the piebald past of many Stambuli monuments has occluded knowledge of Ottoman social achievements. It is not a glorious past of bonhomie on all fronts but it is also not one of perpetual subordination of non-Muslims to Islamic norms and values, practices and privileges.

While facile accounts of either dhimmitude or convivencia are to be eschewed, concludes Salzmann, there is still a case to be made for “the value of an Ottoman urbanity”, and among those who advocated that hope was the murdered Armenian editor, Hrant Dank. Ironically, in an interview published before his death, he spoke of an interstitial identity, one “forged by a dialectic between a millennial Anatolian heritage and the quotidian sights and sounds of the Muslim society that surrounded him.” [[23]](#footnote-23)

**III -- Asef Bayat on Cairo**

 It is precisely those quotidian sights and sounds of Muslim society that occupy sociologist Asef Bayat in his examination of another minority, Copts in Cairo, specifically in the Shubra district, adjacent to Azbakiya, Sahel and Rod El-Farag, all populated by a significant Coptic minority in modernday Cairo. For most of the 20th century, Copts comprised 40% of Shubra’s citizenry. Today they are still 30%. The profile for their neighborhood is not pretty. “The district has lost its past glory, style, elitist distinction, and cosmopolitan posture” observes Bayat. “Shubra Avenue (its main artery) has declined into a congested, crowded road, darkened and depleted by the city’s traffic fumes. The run-down remains of old-style homes, two- or three- story villas, are now surrounded by tasteless, boxy and flimsy buildings, struggling to emerge out of layers of dust and pollution.”

Slide # 21 – Near St. Mark’s, Azbakeya, Cairo

Yet, argues Bayat, Shubra is different than other such environmentally challenged urban neighborhoods in downtown Cairo. Not only does it still have many unveiled women among its public shoppers and workers, but in Shubra’s skyline “minarets of cross and crescent conjoin sometimes in juxtaposed proximity, staring at each other in resolve and rectitude”. [[24]](#footnote-24)And it is this proximity – in living, in shopping, in worshipping – that produces what Bayat terms a “dialectic of conflict and coexistence.” [[25]](#footnote-25)

Though Muslim sounds, especially the five time daily ***adhan***s, “blasting from the loudspeakers hooked onto the front doors of neighborhood mosques”, are prevalent, many of Bayat’s Coptic informants responded that they simply did not hear them. And though interreligious clashes did arise in some everyday interactions, they were surprisingly few, and “many of the laypeople time and again try to find solutions to their differences,” ignoring extremists on both sides, politicians and, of course, the national media, almost all of it geared toward the Muslim majority interest and outlook. [[26]](#footnote-26)

And so Shubra represents a curious test case for cosmopolitanism. On the one hand, there are those who advocate exclusive communal identity (nationalist/Islamist) and on the other, those who experience, and try to practice, inclusive inter-communal connectedness (everyday cosmopolitanism). Which will prevail, and what differences have emerged since the Arab spring? It may be too early to answer but it brings to the foreground how crucial is the cosmopolitan difference in thinking about social comity, as also its opposite, social violence, in urban settings such as Cairo.

Bayat, like Salzman, takes an upbeat view. Concerning the 2006 clash in Alexandria, where 3 people were killed, he observes that it was **only** 3, and they were killed by police rubber bullets, not by religious rivals. Can “the lived experience of interpersonal association, sharing and trust, that is, everyday cosmopolitanism…contain indiscriminate sectarian divide and dissension”? [[27]](#footnote-27) And one must further ask: Is Bayat’s account balanced as description, and accurate as prediction, of either Cairo or Alexandria or other Middle East Muslim majority cities?

**IV – Hanley’s Rejoinder to Bayat, from Alexandria**

Will Hanley, an historian of late 19th century Alexandria, is less certain than Bayat or Salzmann that cosmopolitan norms and values will prevail. He focuses on public discourse. Provocatively he examines curses and public cursing. He sees them as a double challenge to cosmopolitanism, first to its ethical norms (mutual respect) and then to its social ideals (co-existence). Yet Hanley argues that the innuendos of cursing also show how local actors understand, and thus limit, what would seem to be the worst effects of anti-cosmopolitan behavoir. He notes the importance of including counter-intuitive evidence: what seems to weigh against cosmopolitanism might actually allow, and promote, genuine, sustainable cosmopolitan futures. On the one hand, poor Muslim Egyptians are deemed not to be cosmopolitan. They dress badly, and curse loudly, yet one cannot describe Cairene or Alexandrine cosmopolitanism without including these subjects, now citizens, deemed to be outside its scope.

Final slide # 22 - Protesting Hillary visit to Cairo in July 2012

 Hanley is especially dismissive of armchair cosmopolitanism. He cites, then excoriates several theorists who advocate Eurocentric cosmopolitanism. [[28]](#footnote-28) Cosmopolitanism, in his view, is neither imitative nor mimetic. It cannot be elitist, consumerist, neo-liberal or secular; it must instead be inclusive, vernacular, rootless, and everyday.

Hanley’s is a modest agenda. It also suits to summarize and conclude this paper:

* Cosmopolitanism theory, in order to work, must begin by privileging specific moments and local contexts;

 at the same time that

* Cosmopolitan watchdogs have to guard against their own bias to power and the proclivity to insist on pure principle, i.e., abstract, faceless categories.[[29]](#footnote-29)

To these two shibboleths I would add a further desideratum:

* Without ignoring the achievements of Euro-American civilization, cosmopolitan advocates must recognize a decolonized Muslim *jihad fikri*, one that insists on a differential calculus of longing and belonging, traceable to Islamic civilization but not limited to its achievements.

Islamic(ate) civilization endures as a resource. It offers more than nostalgia for Muslim cosmopolitans. Yet there is no guarantee that Muslim cosmopolitanism will prevail against the competing tides of fundamentalism and authoritarianism. Buffeted both by Islamist politics and the praetorian/military state, Muslim cosmopolitanism remains an ideal more than a reality, yet its existence, and persistence, is worthy of attention from the recent as well as the distant past, not only in the Middle East but also in those in-between places such as the Maghrib and South Asia. Thank you.

1. Ali Allawi, ***The Crisis of Islamic Civilization*** (New Haven:Yale University Press, 2009): 104-108. For an expansive view of Jabiri, from one of the major advocates of Muslim cosmopolitanism, see <http://caroolkersten.blogspot.com/2010/05/death-of-averroist-muhammad-abid-al.html>. It is no accident that Jabiri did his pioneering dissertation on Ibn Khaldun, discussed below. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The best study of Arab Sind remains Derryl N. MacLean, ***Religion and Society in Arab Sind***(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1989). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Ainslee Embree, ed. ***Al Biruni’s India*** (New York; W.W. Norton, 1971): 6 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Ibid: 4 [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Ibid, 24 [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Cited from E.S. Kennedy, "Al-Biruni (or Beruni), Abu Rayhan (or Abu’l Rayhan) Muhammad Ibn Ahmad" in *Dictionary of Scientific Biography*, vol.2 (New York: Charles Scribners’s Sons, 1989): 155. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. For the first and fullest development of Ibn Khaldun as an ***adib,*** see miriam cooke, “Ibn Khaldun and Language: From Linguistic Habit to Philological Craft” in Bruce B. Lawrence, ed., ***Ibn Khaldun and Islamic Ideology*** (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1984): 27-36. There is no single English equivalent of ***adab***, and so I leave it untranslated, yet for stylistic ease I have taken the liberty of rendering ***adib,*** one who practices and pursues ***adab,*** as litterateur. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. See Bruce B. Lawrence, Introduction to Franz Rosenthal, tr., ***The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History***, abridged and edited by N.J. Dawood (Princeton: Princeton University Press, Bollingen Series, 1967/2005): xvi [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. ***Hadith*** criticism is in effect the science of personality criticism (***‘ilm al-jarh wal-ta‘dil***). Though introduced at the outset of Book One of ***Kitab al-‘ibar,*** (Dawood, abridg., Rosenthal, tr., ***op. cit.:*** 35:n1),it is not fully explained till much later, requiring the reader to make explicit the connection that is left implicit by Ibn Khaldun. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Abdesselam Cheddadi***, Actualite d’Ibn Khaldun:Conferences et Entretiens*** (Temara: Maison des Arts, des Sciences et des Lettres 2006): 69 shows the importance of this category for Ibn Khaldun. I am indebted to Cheddadi for this citation (69) as for many other insights into the mercurial, restless mind of Ibn Khaldun. I differ only in translating the Arabic phrase as “known world” (corresponding to Greek *ecumene*) rather than inhabited world, since the former suggests the connectedness of those distant parts, often port cities on islands or continents, that were more aware of a dispersed human community across the globe than were their neighbors living in remote inland regions. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. For those of you old enough to remember, this ascription came from the 40th US President Ronald Reagan, in a 1992 editorial he penned after leaving office. “May I offer you the advice of the 14th century Arab historian Ibn Khaldun? He said: ‘At the beginning of the empire, the tax rates were low and the revenues were high. At the end of the empire, the tax rates were high and the revenues were low.’ And, no, I did not personally know Ibn Khaldun, although we may have had some friends in common!” [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Youssef M. Choueiri. ***Islamic Fundamentalism*** (Boston: Twayne, 1990): 35. I am indebted to Choueiri for his clear exposition of Islamic fundamentalism, but I demur from his use of 'radicalism' to refer to the last or most recent phase of Islamic protest. The term 'radical', unlike revivalism and reformism, has no positive referent. It presupposes some other norm, and in my view, that norm is a strict religious code or sense of inalterable, all-encompassing fundamentals, hence my use of 'fundamentalism' in preference to 'radicalism' to denote the last and most significant phase of Islamic protest. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Allawi, ***op. cit.:*** 72-73 [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Mignolo, ***The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options*** (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011): 98 [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. ***Ibid.*** [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. For the several citations in the above portrait of M.F. Husain, see Bruce B. Lawrence, “All Distinctions are Political, Artificial: The Fuzzy Logic of M.F. Husain” in ***Common Knowledge*** 19/2 (2013):269-274 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Amy Mills, ***Streets of Memory: Landscape, Tolerance, and National Identity in Istanbul*** (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2010):8. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. ***Ibid.,*** 10. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. ***Ibid.,*** 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. ***Ibid.,*** 207. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. ***Ibid.,*** 211. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Ariel Salzman, “Islampolis, Cosmopolis: Ottoman Urbanity between Myth, Memory and Postmodernity”, in Derryl N. MacLean and Sikeena Karmali Ahmed, eds., ***Cosmopolitanisms in Muslim Contexts: Perspectives from the Past*** (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012): 68. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. ***Ibid.,*** 86. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Asef Bayat, “Everyday Cosmopolitanism” in ***Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East*** (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010):196. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. ***Ibid.,*** 200. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. ***Ibid.,*** 201. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. ***Ibid.,*** 208. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Will Hanley, “Cosmopolitan Cursing in Late Nineteenth-Century Alexandria” in McLean/Ahmed, ***op. cit.,***100. John Rawls, Will Kymlicka, and Anthony Appiah – all are taken to task for failing “to describe a cosmopolitanism that does not require the non-cosmopolitan”. See also Hanley’s provocative review of cosmopolitan studies in “**Grieving Cosmopolitanism** in Middle East Studies," ***History Compass*** 6/5 (2008): 1346-1367.

 [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Hanley in McLean/Ahmed, ***op. cit.,***101. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)